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Vol. XVII

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RELATIVE PROGRESS IN THE NATURAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES¹

ARTHUR B. ADAMS

University of Oklahoma

Since the beginning of the industrial breakdown in 1929, the assertion has often been made that the social sciences are far behind the natural sciences in development and in accomplishment. Some claim that the social sciences have made little progress in developing definite social principles of action. These critics assert also that the knowledge which has been developed in the fields of natural sciences is far more valuable and more applicable to everyday life than is the limited knowledge developed in the fields of the social sciences.

Some educators have concluded from the above stated beliefs that the social sciences are now lagging behind the natural sciences because the natural scientists have been more brilliant scholars than the social scientists. One university president recently made an appeal to "bright" young scholars to become interested in the field of the social sciences, so that they might help out the mediocre or "dumb" scholars now in that field. A few who became alarmed over the so-called backwardness of progress in the social sciences suggest that the natural scientists "declare a holiday" from further application of revolutionary discoveries in those fields. Thus, they would give the social sciences an opportunity to catch up with the progress made in the physical world.

To just what extent, and in what respects, are the social sciences actually behind the natural sciences in development and in accomplishment? If the social sciences are lagging behind the natural sciences, what are the reasons for this fact, other than the stupidity of the social science scholars? In making an approach to the questions here raised, let us first

¹Presidential address delivered before the Southwestern Social Science Association, Fort Worth, Texas, April 10, 1936.

examine the chief objects and the primary functions of both the natural and the social sciences.

It is believed that the main objective of each of the natural sciences is to discover the exact relationships existing among the various natural forces and elements in its field, and to state these various relationships in a clear-cut manner. Statements of specific natural relationships should be so general and yet so exact as to merit designation as "laws" or principles of those sciences. The primary function or service of each of the natural sciences is to find out how the various principles or laws developed by it may be most effectively applied for the advancement of human welfare.

The chief function of each of the social sciences is to discover the present and probable future relationships existing among the various social forces and factors dealt with in that field, and to formulate clear-cut statements of each of these relationships. Some of the statements of social relationships may be sufficiently exact and general to be called principles, if not "laws." The primary function of each of the social sciences is to find out why, and to what extent, public welfare may be advanced by effecting certain adjustments in the changing relationships of specific social forces. The secondary function is to point out the exact methods to be employed in bringing about the desired social changes.

The chief objects of the scholars in each of the two general scientific fields are quite similar. Furthermore, service to humanity is the primary function common to both fields. But the particular methods of effectuating the primary functions in each of the two fields differ widely. The natural scientist serves society by pointing out how the unchanging relationships among the natural forces may be utilized to the benefit of man. The social scientist serves society by pointing out how the changeable relationships among the social forces may be directed or controlled to benefit mankind. The first serves by *utilizing* what he finds; the second serves by inducing society to *control* what he finds.

Since the inauguration of the New Deal in government, we have heard much about "social experimentation." Undoubtedly, too little of such experimentation has been tried in the past, and more of it must be carried on in the future. There are, however, insurmountable difficulties in the path of extensive experimenting in the fields of the social sciences.

First, the expenses involved are frequently prohibitive. Second, the opposition encountered (political and otherwise) is usually too strong to permit experimental ventures. Third, it is quite difficult and frequently impossible to find suitable and tractable laboratory materials for such experiments.

On the other hand, the natural sciences are, in their nature, laboratory sciences. While some experimentations in these fields are expensive, most of them are not, and very few are prohibitive in cost. There is little or no effective opposition to experimentation in these fields, so long as it does not involve the habits and prejudices of man. Laboratory materials, too, are usually plentiful, docile, and cheap in the various natural sciences. In these sciences, most of the principles or laws are developed through laboratory experimentation, and are therefore susceptible to proof. In the social sciences, on the other hand, few of the principles are so developed. In the latter field, most of the principles are formulated from observation and reasoning. For that reason, few of them are susceptible to definite proof or demonstration.

Is it any wonder that the *laws* and principles developed in each of the natural sciences are more exact and more permanent than the so-called laws and principles developed in the fields of the various social sciences? In the fields of the natural sciences, one is impressed by the regularity and uniformity of the forces dealt with, and by the permanency of their various relationships. In the field of the social sciences, on the other hand, one is struck by the variability and irregularity of the principal forces, and by the rapid changes in their various relationships. The fixity and the constancy of the forces in the fields of the natural sciences not only permit, but encourage, exact statements of various relationships.

The variability of the social science forces warns one against statements of exact relationships. Almost the only unchanging and universal law in the whole field of the social sciences is that of eternal change. For this reason, social scientists are able to formulate few specific principles which will be true for all times. Social changes, in the course of time, destroy the validity of most of the one-time accepted social laws. One is tempted to state that the specific problems confronting natural scientists are simple, as compared with those confronting the social scientists.

There are two very evident reasons why discoveries in the

natural sciences are readily and generally applied by man. First, it is usually profitable to apply the new developments in physics, chemistry, botany, etc. It is more profitable to raise bigger and better tomatoes developed by the botanist than it is to continue the production of the old, unimproved varieties. It is usually more profitable to use an improved chemical process in refining oil than it is to use an old, unimproved one. Second, it is usually unnecessary for an individual to get the consent of others, or to have a law passed, to permit him to apply the new discoveries of the natural sciences. Usually, without obtaining anyone's consent, he may apply any of these principles whenever he finds it to his advantage to do so. All that is required for anyone to buy a new and improved machine and use it in production is the necessary capital to make the purchase.

The antithesis of this situation exists with reference to the practical application of the most important discoveries and developments in the social science fields. Ordinarily, it is not profitable to those who dominate society to permit application of the most valuable discoveries in the social science fields. For example, it is generally conceded by most economists that a less unequal distribution of the national income would be of very great social and economic benefit to this nation. Even though the industrial leaders might concede that such would be the case, nevertheless, the majority of them would be definitely opposed to making such a change in the distribution of income. The change would curtail their personal incomes, and otherwise interfere with their selfish ambitions.

Most politicians would readily concede that the character of public service would be improved greatly as a result of the adoption of the merit system in the employment of public servants. Yet most of them would actively oppose such reforms because they would interfere with the dispensation of "political pie." The application of scientific principles developed by the social sciences involves not only changes in human habits and customs, but it frequently requires the enactment of new legislation. In order to secure the adoption of new social principles, the public must be educated as to the necessity of this step. Not only must the public be educated as to the necessity of making the proposed changes, but the proponents of these suggested alterations must successfully combat the propaganda of those groups which, for selfish

reasons, oppose such changes.

It sometimes happens that the practical application of a new discovery in some natural science field would not prove profitable to those who apply it. In such a case, the discovery is not readily applied. If the application of a particular discovery in a natural science involves economic sacrifices on the part of the persons directly affected by it, or if the application involves changes in their ideas, customs, and institutions, it will be utilized only after much opposition, if utilized at all. Under these circumstances, the natural scientist, in the application of his ideas, is confronted with the same kind of obstacles that the social scientist faces at all times with reference to the application of his ideas.

In order to apply the principles developed by any one of the social sciences, it is necessary, in most cases, to bring about changes in the habits, customs, and institutions of society. In other words, in order to apply them, it is necessary to make radical changes in the operation of some of the social forces. But the application of principles of the natural sciences usually involves nothing more than the utilization of certain natural forces, without bringing about any fundamental changes in their operation. Natural forces are ordinarily utilized in connection with the production or creation of usable goods and services. The application of principles of the natural sciences, therefore, has to do largely with physical production. On the other hand, the application of most principles of the social sciences has to do with the consumption or use of things already produced. The forces of nature can be harnessed or guided more easily than the activities of man can be changed or controlled.

Considering these facts, is it any wonder that the most valuable discoveries made in the various fields of the social sciences have been applied less generally than have those made in the various fields of the natural sciences? To secure wider adoption of new social science principles, it is necessary for the social scientist to be an educator and a public leader, as well as a scientist. In some cases, it may be necessary for him to become a politician, if not a propagandist, in order to secure the adoption of the principles he advocates.

To me, it does not appear strange that man, in his activities, has been better able to understand and take advantage of

the forces of nature than he has to understand and control his relationships with other human beings. On the contrary, it would seem extraordinary if he had not made more progress toward conquering his physical environment than toward perfecting his relationships with others.

Let us admit, then, that the knowledge developed in the natural science fields has been more precise in character and more widespread in application than has that developed in the social science fields. But what of it? Only the uninformed would conclude from this premise that the developments in the natural sciences have been of greater value to mankind than those in the social science fields. Certainly, one could not conclude from the facts that the social scientists are "dumber" than the natural scientists, although the nature of the theories expounded by some of them would indicate that not all of them are "bright."

LABOR AND FARMER GROUPS AND THE THREE-PARTY SYSTEM

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Demands for a re-alignment of political parties in this country have in the past usually arisen from the feeling that the two old parties are too nearly alike in general outlook and policies. The long-sought ideal is a party system which will give the voters a real choice between conservatism, on the one hand, and liberalism or progressivism, on the other hand. It would appear that this demand has now been met by a change of emphasis within the two major parties. The Democratic party under President Roosevelt's leadership has become the party of progressive political action, and the Republican party has been forced into a position which it very much likes, namely, to pose as the protector of conservative interests and the sponsor of conservative doctrines.

There will be difference of opinion as to whether the Roosevelt administration is following a truly liberal policy. It is, however, clear that President Roosevelt has given a gloss of liberalism to the Democratic party, and has thoroughly committed it to a policy of experimentation. The truth is that "liberal" is a much misused word. It has often been used by left-wing political groups to mask their socialistic tendencies. But there is a difference between socialism and liberalism, although it is clear in the post-war era that they are both policies of collectivism. The Democratic party stands at present, and the indications are that it will continue to stand, for a policy of collectivism which is designed to preserve all of the essentials of the capitalist system. It may therefore be fairly characterized as capitalist collectivism. It is significant to observe that this is substantially the position arrived at by the British Liberal party in the last years of its decline.

We may therefore be assured that as long as the Democratic party continues in its present trend and remains under its present leadership there will be no opportunity for a new party designed to express merely liberal or progressive sentiment. A good deal of evidence has accumulated in recent years to indicate that a new political party, in order to have

any chance of success, will have to try to occupy a place to the left of President Roosevelt.¹ It can not go as far left as to be a purely socialist party, as the lack of success by the Socialist party throughout the many years of its existence proves that the American working-class will not respond to such an appeal. The new party must attempt to occupy a position somewhere between liberalism and socialism, standing probably closer to socialism than liberalism. The popularization of such socialistic formulas as "production for use" and "the cooperative commonwealth" has made this seem a tenable position.

The recent emergence in American politics of a significant radical movement is clearly discernible in the adoption of a distinctly socialistic platform by the Minnesota Farmer-Labor party in 1934, the appearance in the 1934 elections of the Wisconsin Progressive party with a platform not materially different, the EPIC movement in California, the Share Our Wealth Society, and in other movements. It is plain that any amalgamation of these trends to produce a radical party will have to proceed along the lines of producing a mass organization participated in by a considerable portion of the urban working-class and the poorer element of the farming population. An examination of the attitude of existing labor and farmer groups towards independent political action will therefore help to reveal the immediate future of the party system.

The most inclusive organization of unemployed workers, the Workers' Alliance of America, has declared in favor of the formation of an independent labor party. The preamble of its constitution, adopted at the first national convention in Washington, D. C., March 2-4, 1935, announces "the readiness of the unemployed to join in a genuine party based on the trade union movement, and *bona fide* farmer groups."²

Within the American Federation of Labor there has been in recent years a re-emergence of the demand for the abandonment of the traditional political policy of rewarding friends

¹Cf. Governor Floyd B. Olson's remark to the 1934 convention of the Minnesota Farmer-Labor party: "Now, I am frank to say that I am not a liberal . . . I am what I want to be—I am a radical." See *Minneapolis Journal*, March 28, 1934. And Governor Phillip LaFollette of Wisconsin: "You see I'm no middle-of-the-road liberal. I believe in a fundamental and basic change." See *N.Y. Times*, July 28, 1935.

²Saul Parker, "Jobless form national organization," *New Leader*, March 9, 1935.

and punishing enemies, in favor of a policy of assisting in the establishment of a labor party. A number of important unions have declared in favor of independent political action. Among these are the three great unions of the needle trades, namely, Amalgamated Clothing Workers, Cap and Millinery Workers, and International Ladies' Garment Workers; United Textile Workers; American Federation of Hosiery Workers; Hotel and Restaurant Workers; Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers' International; Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel, and Tin Workers' International; and it is generally conceded that the sentiment in favor of a labor party is strong within the railway brotherhoods. It will be noted that the unions favoring the formation of a labor party are of the industrial type as distinct from the craft unions. State conventions of the American Federation of Labor have declared in favor of a labor party in ten states, Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, Utah, and Wisconsin.³ On the other hand, the New York State Federation, which is the largest section of the national organization, recently rejected a motion calling for the formation of a new party, and instead expressed warm endorsement of President Roosevelt.⁴ Resolutions calling for the support of a labor party have been introduced in the recent national conventions of the American Federation of Labor, but a direct vote on this question has been avoided. In the 1935 convention it was estimated that a partisan political policy had the support of delegates representing about one-sixth of the total membership.⁵ Recent speeches of President Green have seemed to give some encouragement to this growing sentiment within the federation.⁶

The leaders of this movement assume that a political party sponsored by organized labor would be a radical party. The Oregon and Utah Federation of Labor have committed themselves to the production-for-use formula.⁷ The increase in strikes since 1934, and especially the tendency to general

³On the sentiment within the A. F. of L. in favor of a labor party see *New Leader*, May 18, October 12, 1935; *N.Y. Times*, July 19, August 21, 1935; *Minnesota Leader*, October 12, 1935; Jack Stachel, "A new page for American labor," *Communist*, 14: 1015-33 (November, 1935).

⁴*N.Y. Times*, August 23, 1935.

⁵*Ibid.*, October 4, 1933, October 12, 1934.

⁶*New Leader*, May 18, 1935, October 12, 1935.

⁷*Minnesota Leader*, October 12, 1935.

strikes in San Francisco and other large industrial cities, may also be interpreted as evidence of a growing radicalism in American labor.⁸

There is, however, little likelihood that the advocates of a labor party will gain the ascendancy within the organized labor movement in the near future. As long as the federation is occupied with the internal struggle over the question of industrial or craft unionism, which was brought out in the open so dramatically at the 1935 convention in Atlantic City, and with the effort to purge the federated unions of all Communists, there will be little energy left over to start the arduous task of building up a political appendage to the industrial movement. The political movement may of course be accelerated if it proves to be linked with the demand for the recognition of vertical unions in basic industries. The desire for a labor party will probably continue to find expression on a local scale, as has recently occurred in Essex County, New Jersey, and Toledo, Ohio,⁹ and in close cooperation with left-wing parties such as the Minnesota Farmer-Labor party and the Wisconsin Progressive Party. But the fundamental change in policy which would necessarily precede the launching of a political movement on a nation-wide scale will probably not occur for a number of years, and a national labor party without the active participation of the American Federation of Labor is a very remote possibility.

The same tendency towards radical political thought and the demand for a new political party have appeared within the farmers' organizations. Among the principal farmers' organizations the National Farm Bureau Federation is the only one which has kept itself completely free from radical tendencies, remaining steadfast in its support of the agricultural policy of the administration. Even the National Grange has qualified its support of the administration, and has been connected with leftist political movements in Oregon and Washington.¹⁰ The National Farmers' Union has recently declared itself in favor of the peaceful overthrow of the capitalist system and the establishment of the cooperative commonwealth,¹¹ and

⁸See report of Earl Browder to the central committee, *Communist*, 13:931-67 (October, 1934), and the resolutions of the central committee of the Communist party, *ibid.*, p. 968.

⁹*N.Y. Times*, June 24, 1934; *Minnesota Leader*, October 26, 1935.

¹⁰*N.Y. Times*, June 24, 1934; *Minnesota Leader*, October 26, 1935.

¹¹*Farmer-Labor Leader*, December 30, 1934.

sentiment is strong within it in favor of the establishment of a new political party for this purpose. Two new and definitely radical farmers' organizations have come into existence in recent years, the National Farmers' Holiday Association and the Southern Tenant Farmers' Union. The Farmers' Holiday Association had as its original purpose the improvement of agricultural prices by stopping the production and marketing of farm products. It soon expressed itself in the forceful prevention of mortgage sales and vigorous demands for a reduction in taxes and moratoriums on farm debts. The movement spread rapidly through the midwestern states, and at the height of its development it probably had three-quarters of a million members. By mid-summer of 1933 it seemed to be dying out as a result of a few ugly clashes with the authorities and a sharp rise in food prices. The Holiday Association has, however, retained its vitality, particularly in Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Iowa, and in its convention at Des Moines in May, 1935, it declared itself in favor of a production-for-use economy and pledged its support to a new political party to be composed of farmers and laborers. The Holiday Association insists upon its loyalty to democratic methods of realizing its aims, and has steadfastly resisted the efforts of Communists to capture its leadership.¹²

The Southern Tenant Farmers' Union was founded in Arkansas in the summer of 1934 under Socialist leadership with the object of ameliorating the conditions of the sharecroppers. It is said to have a membership of 12,000 to 15,000. Bad judgment in failing to observe the conventions of interracial relations handicapped it from the first, and its influence has been inconsiderable.¹³ Similar organizations under Communist leadership in other southern states have been more effective in obtaining recognition of their demands. The general farmers' organization sponsored by the Communists is called the United Farmers' League. At its first national convention in Minneapolis, June, 1934, it was claimed that it had 10,000 members in eighteen states and that its membership and activities have been increasing rapidly in recent years. The Communists are confident that a strong class-conscious

¹²*Minnesota Leader*, May 4, 11, 1935

¹³*N.Y. Times*, April 19, September 3, 1935.

organization can be developed among the poorest farmers.¹⁴

The growth of sentiment within labor and farmer groups in favor of a new radical party has been recognized by the two principal working-class parties already in existence, the Socialist and the Communist parties, and steps have been taken within each to assume the leadership of the new movement. The membership of both of these parties has increased in recent years,¹⁵ but it is clear that neither has yet become a mass organization capable of canalizing the sentiment for a labor party. Late in 1934 the national executive committee of the Socialist party appointed a special committee to canvass "the attitude of farmers and workers towards effective political action," and to recommend what action should be taken by the Socialists.¹⁶ On the basis of the report of this committee, the national executive has decided at subsequent meetings to support its own ticket in all elections, and to refuse to join in any new third party in the immediate future.¹⁷ The basis for this decision was apparently the conviction that organized labor is not ready to participate in the move, and that a national farmer-labor party of any significance is therefore impossible in 1936. A number of influential Socialists, including Norman Thomas, nevertheless favor making an effort to capture the leadership of the third-party sentiment, in order to create a farmer-labor party in which the Socialists may play a rôle similar to that played by Socialists in the British Labor party.

The Socialist party is at the present time torn by factional

¹⁴See John Barnett, "The United Farmers' League Convention," *Communist*, 13:810-19 (August, 1934), and resolution of the national convention of the Communist Party, *ibid.*, 449.

¹⁵Membership of Socialist party:

June 1, 1932, 15,332

January 1, 1933, 20,655

June 1, 1934, 22,861.

See *N.Y. Times*, June 1, 1934.

Membership of Communist party:

April, 1930, 7,545

April, 1934, 24,500

July, 1935, 31,000 (est.)

See J. Peters, "Problems of party growth," *Communist*, 13:1005-14 (October, 1934); Jack Stachel, "Organizational problems of the party," *ibid.*, 14: 625-40 (July, 1935).

¹⁶*New Leader*, December 8, 1934, February 16, 1935.

¹⁷*N.Y. Times*, March 24, October 14, 1935.

strife to a degree unknown since the Communist split of 1919. The new declaration of principles, submitted to a referendum of the party membership by the national convention of 1934 in Detroit, has split the party into a right wing, or "old guard," and a left wing, or the "militants." This declaration, sponsored by the militants who dominated the convention, countenances conscientious objection to military service, and seems to advocate the dictatorship of the proletariat. It was adopted by a narrow margin in the referendum, but important elements of the party remain irreconcilable. A third faction formed at the Detroit convention, called the Revolutionary Policy Publishing Association, claims to be the truly militant wing of the Socialist party. The intensity of these factional struggles will undoubtedly weaken the Socialist party for years to come in any steps it may take towards sponsoring a mass party.

Under the stimulus of the manifesto of the Third International, issued in March, 1933, the Communist party has tried to assume the political leadership of the working-class under the guise of the United Front. About the only result in this country has been the organization called the League Against War and Fascism, which seems to be an ineffective union of Communists with religious radicals and pacifists. A still more striking reversal of the usual Communist policy of non-cooperation may be perceived in the resolution of the central committee in January, 1935, pledging the Communist party to ally itself with other working-class groups and declaring its readiness to enter a mass labor party.¹⁸ The Communist party also has its factional divisions, some of which are of recent origin. At least the following groups may be distinguished: a Gitlow right wing;¹⁹ a Lovestone right wing; the Workers' party, recently formed by a union of the Muste group with the Trotskyites;²⁰ and the Proletarian party, which is the extreme left wing.²¹

How, then, will the demand for a radical political party find expression in the present party system? The most likely development of the near future is the further growth of

¹⁸*Communist*, 14:117-26 (February, 1935).

¹⁹*N.Y. Times*, February 4, 1933.

²⁰*New Leader*, January 12, 1935.

²¹*Cf.* McAlister Coleman, "Who are the Communists," *World Tomorrow*, 15:323-25 (October 5, 1932).

state farmer-labor parties, such as are now enjoying a measure of power in two neighboring states of the northwest, Minnesota and Wisconsin. Two prominent leaders of these parties, Governors Floyd B. Olson and Phillip LaFollette, have recently expressed their conviction that a new political party must be built from the bottom upwards, by first creating state parties which may later be welded together into a national party.²² No student of American politics will doubt the soundness of this tactic, although it has generally been ignored by the third-party movements of the past. To gain control of a state administration means patronage to distribute, and propaganda carried on by leaders who hold responsible posts in the government has an air of respectability never attained by the mere aspirant to power. At the same time, it must be recognized that the establishment of state political parties encourages a certain hypocrisy in public life. If a new party is going to advocate the fundamental modification of the capitalist system, as the governors of Minnesota and Wisconsin have demanded, it is obvious that such a program can not be realized without control of the federal government. Thus, Governor Olson explained away some of the most radical planks in the Farmer-Labor platform by saying that they could not possibly be put into effect by a party in control only of the state government. This need of the powers of the federal government will be a continuous propulsion to force the state parties together and into a bid for power on a nation-wide basis.²³

Sponsored by the National Farmer-Labor Political Federation, or the American Commonwealth Political Federation as it is known in the east, farmer-labor parties have been launched in seven mid-western states—Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, North Dakota, and South Dakota.²⁴ Similar organizations have also appeared in the three Pacific coast

²²*Minnesota Leader*, March 30, 1935; *The Progressive*, May 25, 1935.

²³Thus, the state committee of the Minnesota Farmer-Labor party resolved in May, 1935, "that the Farmer-Labor association is equipped and ready to join in a national third-party movement," and "that the association will cooperate in the formation of such a party." See *Minnesota Leader*, June 1, 1935.

²⁴See the reports of the national organizer, Howard Y. Williams, in *The Progressive*, January 5, April 27, May 4, 1935.

states²⁵ and Ohio.²⁶ Thus, fully one-quarter of the states have already been equipped with political movements pledged to the elimination of the capitalist system. These different state parties range in importance all the way from the preliminary stage of organization in some of the states to the powerful parties of Minnesota and Wisconsin.

The establishment of a socialistic party of laborers and farmers, even when only on a state-wide scale, is a fundamental modification of our party system. These organizations do not intend to serve merely the usual function of a third party. They do not aim merely to ginger up the old parties; they expect to displace one or both of the old parties. They advocate radical policies, but they will not be content, as would a typical third party, to see their policies carried into effect by one of the old parties. The farmer-labor parties expect to serve an apprenticeship as minor parties, and ultimately to become a national major party. If there is a real popular demand behind this movement, and this can not be doubted as regards some of the states affected, we shall see for years in some of our states a three-party system similar to that which has prevailed in England during the post-war period. The situation may be summed up as follows: We already have in a few states, and are soon likely to have in more states, and may ultimately have in the nation as a whole, a Socialist or near-Socialist party which is powerful enough that it has to be reckoned with as a factor in public life. This is a new thing in American politics. What are the implications of the appearance of a socialist party as a permanent member of our party system?

In the first place it may be observed that our structure of government does not fit the three-party system. The unitary form of the executive, together with the requirement of a majority of the votes in the electoral college for the election of the president, creates an awkward situation for a third party. In a country with the cabinet system of government there is always the possibility of the formation of a coalition, although this solution may be difficult to realize in practice. But there is no satisfactory way to establish coalition government in our system. There may be a fusion or cooperation in the support

²⁵*Ibid.*, March 23, May 4, 1935; *Minnesota Leader*, October 26, 1935; N.Y. *Times*, June 24, 1934.

²⁶*The Progressive*, May 25, June 8, August 10, 1935.

of candidates in elections, and two parties may share in the distribution of patronage, but it is impossible to share in the control over a unitary executive. At the same time, a political party wishing to carry its policy into effect must gain control of the executive because of the broad and independent powers vested in that office. These structural features of our government will always handicap a third party in its rise to power, but of course they do not make success impossible.

In the second place, the appearance of a socialistic party is certain to have profound effects upon the alignment of voters with the two old parties. The simplest solution would be for one of the old parties to disappear, dividing its voting strength between the remaining old party and the new radical party. In present circumstances it might be supposed that it would be the Republican party which would be pushed out of the picture.²⁷ However, in the long run it would certainly be the Democratic party which would suffer the greater loss of strength to a rising radical party. This would be so, partly because under a menace of socialism its opponents are driven into the party with the strongest conservative traditions, and partly because the Republican party is normally the majority party. In southern states the Democratic party would doubtless receive this accession of conservative support. The advocates of a political party with advanced ideas have long regarded the Democratic party as the principal obstacle to their progress,²⁸ and it would indeed be a simple solution if the Democrats would quietly withdraw and leave the field to an anti-capitalist party. Those who anticipate the extinction of the Democratic party in such circumstances do not reckon with the extraordinary vitality of the liberal point of view, as illustrated in the repeated refusals of the British Liberal party to fulfill the predictions of its death. Nor do they take proper account of the influence of national elections and federal patronage in preserving the existence of the party, as for example the Republican party in many southern states and the Democratic party in Minnesota.

²⁷Cf. the speculations on the future of the Democratic party in the addresses and discussions at the Institute of statesmanship, Winter Park, Florida, March 25-29, 1929, as published in *The Future of Party Government* (ed. by L. H. Jenks, Rollins Press, Winter Park, Florida, 1929).

²⁸Paul H. Douglas, "Who are the Democrats?" *World Tomorrow*, 15:301-3 (September 28, 1932).

Another variation of this simple solution of the three-party problem is to bring about fusion for electoral purposes. This might take the form of cooperation between Republicans and Democrats, as has taken place sometimes in Reading,²⁹ and in other cities where the Socialists have had some success. In Minnesota all of the efforts to bring about the formation of a conservative bloc to defeat Governor Olson have proved failures.³⁰ In fact, what has happened in Minnesota is a split within the Democratic party on the question of electoral fusion. The official wing of the party (called the "Regulars") under the leadership of the national committeeman, Joseph Wolf, has consistently given its support to Farmer-Labor candidates in state politics, while maintaining friendly relations with the national administration and having charge of the distribution of federal patronage within the state. In return, the Farmer-Labor votes have been cast for the Democratic presidential ticket. The so-called "Rumper" faction of the Democratic party has objected to this practice of fusion, and while it is the majority faction, dominating the Democratic primary and the state committee, it has steadfastly been excluded from sharing in the federal patronage. In Wisconsin the Democrats were generally content to give their electoral support to the Progressives, until the electoral success of the Democratic national ticket in 1932 gave them new hope for a separate existence.

The limited experience with fusion around a socialistic party therefore tends to show that it is difficult to bring about any permanent combination, especially on a state-wide scale. An unusual feature of legislative elections in Minnesota has, however, favored the fusion of conservative forces and has prevented the Farmer-Labor party from ever gaining control of even one house of the legislature. Minnesota is the only state in the Union in which legislative elections are conducted on a non-partisan basis, and the primary law permits the nomination of only two candidates for each seat.³¹ This practically requires fusion of some kind under the three-party system which prevails, and the results so far have favored the conservatives. It will be observed that fusion of this kind is

²⁹N.Y. *Times*, December 31, 1933; *New Leader*, November 9, 1935.

³⁰See the dispatches of Herbert Lefkowitz, N. Y. *Times*, April 8, October 7, 1934.

³¹Minn. *Election Laws* 1932, sec. 294.

particularly easy on a local scale under the cover of non-partisan primary and election laws. In fact, the failure of the Minnesota Farmer-Labor party and the Wisconsin Progressive party to gain control over their legislatures seems to demonstrate the innate conservatism of the American people. Their principal electoral success so far has been to elect, unquestionably with the aid of voters normally attached to the old parties, two especially able and popular young men as governors. This limited success in the two most radical states would seem to indicate that an anti-capitalist party will find its road to power a long and difficult one.

It is well to remember, however, that both Minnesota and Wisconsin have the open form of the direct primary. With the anti-capitalist parties dominated as they are by brilliant leaders, and carefully organized in dues-paying associations, so that contests are not likely to develop within their own primaries, it is possible to send detachments of Farmer-Labor voters into the primaries of the old parties for the purpose of nominating weak candidates. The radical leaders might then hope to gain many votes from the old parties in the general election. There has been so far little evidence of this kind of cross-voting in the open primaries, seeing that the Minnesota law was enacted only in 1933,³² and that the Wisconsin Progressive party has enjoyed its separate existence for such a short time.

It remains only to ask in conclusion whether a new farmer-labor party with an anti-capitalist policy is likely to alter the practices of politics or to raise the standards of public life? It has often been supposed that a party based upon the primary organizations of laborers and farmers would be more mindful of the interests of the whole community, and would refrain from the questionable practices so common in American public life. In Minnesota, where the experience of such a party has been of the longest duration, the Farmer-Labor party regards itself as primarily a machine for the purpose of distributing the spoils of office in exactly the same manner as the old parties.³³ Appointments in the state administration have generally been made on a political basis, and employes in some departments, particularly the highway department, have

³²Minn. Sess. Laws 1933, c. 244.

³³Cf. J. C. Meyers, "Governor Olson of Minnesota," *Nation*, 133:539-40 (November 18, 1931).

been expected to do organization and electioneering work. The assessment of state employes for the political fund has been openly admitted on more than one occasion. The evidence so far available indicates that a radical party will merely adopt and follow the familiar methods and practices of the old parties.

AGRICULTURAL-INDUSTRIAL RELATIONSHIPS IN A COORDINATED ADJUSTMENT PROGRAM

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This paper is an attempted diagnosis of our unsound agricultural-industrial relationships so evident in recent years and a quest for means of promoting a sound and durable relationship between agriculture and industry. Neither agricultural nor general depression should be regarded as an exclusive problem. The causes of each are intimately related, if not identical. Remedial measures, exclusive in nature, must therefore be applied to farmers or to any other depressed group with great caution. An intelligent attack on the problem can be made only by being ever mindful that the interrelations between agriculture and industry are intimately mutual and by regarding depressed agriculture as only one sector on the broad front of general economic depression. Depression in either agriculture or industry ultimately affects the other adversely. Actually, depression struck first in agriculture and spread later to industry, only to become diffused throughout the entire economy. This suggests that an adjustment program must be concerned with the gigantic task of maintaining a balance between industry and agriculture, and a balanced flow of money incomes to the various industries, economic groups, employments, and individuals in proportion to the value of the service each renders society.

The objectives of any adjustment program should be quantity production of goods both agricultural and industrial and a wide and equitable distribution of incomes. Our problem is one of correcting the glaring economic inequality that persists without appreciable signs of abatement.

All the manifestations of depression in recent years—unemployment, bread lines, idle plants, poverty stricken farmers, business failures, and wide-spread insecurity—have a common cause. We have modernized our technology without modernizing the rules by which it is controlled. Twentieth century technology simply fails to function effectively under the ancient rules evolved in and adapted to individual handicraft economy.

Sharp distinction must be drawn between emergency

short-time policy and sound long-time policy. Clearly the former, typified by the late agricultural adjustment administration, must be dictated largely by considerations of expediency. While certain justification may be found for a temporary policy of curtailed production in agriculture, because of the precarious economic plight of farmers in recent years, it is viciously unsound as a permanent policy.

Political expediency unfortunately often necessitates, at most, gradual execution of a sound permanent policy. Yet no policy is economically sound that cannot meet the test of time. We are not to be lulled into a false security by measures that give temporary relief but lack that comprehensive design requisite for abiding general prosperity.

CHANGING TECHNOLOGY AND THE INSTITUTIONAL LAG

It should be emphasized that the causes of the long depression are not artificial or superficial but institutional. The fact that farm prices and farmers' incomes dropped below their pre-war parity in 1921 and have continued below this parity to the present day is something more than a mere accident. A summary statement of the fundamental cause of this price disparity is a rapidly changing technology in a relatively static institutional system. The depression is but another dark chapter in the relentless conflict between static institutions and a dynamic technology—between the old order of individualistic, competitive, handicraft production on the one hand and the new order of strictly regimented, though ever-changing, technology on the other.

Our conceptions of liberty, property rights, and governmental functions were shaped prior to the Industrial Revolution when handicraft and the one-man enterprise prevailed in practically all employments. Agriculture has continued in the main to function on the more primitive basis, though even here recent changes of great significance have been wrought. Ever since the Civil War, however, industry has been increasingly mechanized and regimented internally. Moreover, the industrialist, like the farmer, has continued to enjoy a large degree of liberty and freedom in the operation of his business. Some restraints have been imposed on industry, it is true, but these we have imposed reluctantly, tardily, and always imperfectly.

The onward march of the Industrial Revolution has promoted efficiency by greatly enlarging the size of the average

industrial plant and thus reducing the number of plants. The fact that there are relatively few units in each mechanized industry facilitates collaboration and the control of output. The widespread refusal to produce goes far to explain why prices and profits in industry have been maintained well above those prevalent in agriculture. It also helps to explain why the depression came to industry eight or nine years later than it came to agriculture.

SMALL-SCALE COMPETITIVE AGRICULTURE

Agriculture, with its more than six million units, has remained preponderantly a small-scale, highly competitive industry. Of its numerous units, estimated at about 6,000,000, approximately one-third or 2,000,000 are cotton farms. On the other hand, the manufacturing industry, whose aggregate annual output is normally only slightly greater in value than that of agriculture, has probably not more than 200,000 units.¹ The farming unit is kept small because, in general, greater economies are not realized through enlarging the scale of operations. The law of diminishing returns and the necessity of the farmer's giving personal attention to his crops militate against the indefinite subordination of tasks and farm combinations. This feature of agriculture remains dominant, despite a tendency toward mechanization.

Again, the farmer produces chiefly food and raw materials, the demand for which is relatively inelastic. This precludes the indefinite expansion of demand for agricultural products through advertising or otherwise. Relatively constant quantities of what the farmer produces are demanded, regardless of the price. The farmer expands his output with an increased demand, but he contracts with a decline in demand only by a very slow and painful process.

THE AGRICULTURAL REVOLUTION

Another cause of the disparity in prices of agricultural products is internal. During the twentieth century there has been in process a revolution in agriculture comparable to the Industrial Revolution that transformed the economic life of Great Britain in the eighteenth century and later transformed the economic life of the United States and the western world.

¹W. E. Spahr and others, *Economic Principles and Problems* (1934), Vol. II, pp. 44-45.

This significant development must be taken into account in formulating a sound public policy. Recent increases in agricultural production abroad, especially in cotton, indicate that it is not confined to the United States. It should also be remembered that expansion in cotton production abroad antedates the Triple A.

Electrical and motor power have been combined with more powerful and more efficient farm machinery; a new technology is being fashioned for agriculture, with the result that an increasing amount of agricultural products may be turned out annually with a decreasing number of hands. The World War, of course, gave new impetus to the mechanization of agriculture. Between 1920 and 1930, the farm population of the United States declined from 31,614,260 to 30,445,350, a drop from 29.9 per cent of the total in 1920, to 24.8 per cent in 1930.² The relatively few farmers with the necessary foresight, adaptability, and capital are utilizing the more efficient processes, thereby lowering their costs and maintaining their incomes. This, however, only makes matters worse for the rank and file of the farmers who cannot or will not adjust themselves to the new techniques. Concurrently, surpluses mounted as prices declined to a level below cost of production for the average farmer.

Of the six million farmers, it has been estimated that even in 1929 only 800,000 were maintaining earnings above \$2,500 each per annum.³ The lot of the remaining more than 5,000,000 farmers has become increasingly severe. Without government aid, cooperation of farmers to control their mounting surpluses has been impracticable, just as control of surplus by industry would be ineffective without government assistance in the form of liberal corporate charters, franchises, liberal patent laws, protective tariffs, etc. Individually each farmer has been under the imperative necessity of producing more cotton, wheat, etc. in order to bolster his diminishing income. Despite the trek from the farm during the decade of the twenties, however, more people have remained on the farm than are needed to produce all the farm products that the market will absorb at remunerative prices. Many, of course, went "back to the land" during the depression. And even under the adjustment plan, thousands of marginal

²*Statistical Abstract of the United States*, 1933, p. 535.

³Bernhard Ostrolenk, *The Surplus Farmer*, (1929), p. 30.

farmers, farm laborers, processors, and middlemen have been stranded. The possibility of their finding profitable employment depends upon our willingness to utilize more fully throughout industry the new techniques. But if we are to put the unemployed back to work, larger industrial output must precede, or at least accompany, larger agricultural output.

INDUSTRIAL MONOPOLY

Notwithstanding our antitrust laws, private monopoly flourishes in the United States—and this with the approval of the Supreme Court. Absolute monopoly is rare, but partial monopoly is wide-spread and appears to be increasing. Mere bigness in a corporation is no longer a crime. And certainly those concerns with monopoly or virtual monopoly power tend further to concentrate wealth and power. Even where there are several business units in one manufacturing industry and no formal monopoly, there is usually close collaboration through the trade association and sufficient control of output to maintain remunerative prices. The result is that industry habitually operates at far less than capacity. This, of course, means fewer goods, higher prices, fewer jobs, a larger relief problem, and lower purchasing power for farmers, laborers, and consumers generally.

Industrial corporations, especially the larger ones, usually operate under liberal corporate charters and franchises, liberal patent laws, protective tariffs, etc., which enable them to enjoy monopoly privilege. This is done within the law, indeed by government grant, and with at least the acquiescence of the public. These concerns have been able to command able counsel and forceful lobbies which have doubtless proved to be worth what they cost.

But this situation has a peculiar significance and applicability to both the farmers' plight and to the problem of general depression. From the national or social point of view, unused capacity in industry is our chief source of waste. Low productivity and the resultant high prices divert purchasing power from the masses into the hands of the few who control the great corporate enterprises. This has been a prominent factor in bringing on the farmers' troubles and in precipitating and prolonging the present depression.

In the spring of 1933 our economic system was on the verge of chaos. There were only two alternatives to apparent

collapse. In order to reestablish parity between prices of manufactured products and prices of farm products, it was necessary either to enlarge industrial output or to curtail production on the farm. We chose the latter alternative. It was temporarily the more expedient method of striking a balance between agriculture and industry. But as a long-run policy it is roughly equivalent to treating smallpox as a skin disease. It is as unsound as our protective tariff.

At any rate, the government proceeded to help the farmer do what it has for more than half a century been helping the industrialist do, that is, limit production.

With all its merits, and strictly as an emergency measure it has some, the agricultural curtailment program has bolstered the farm income at the expense of the entire community. As a long-run policy, it has about the same justification as a long-run policy of highly protective tariffs. Each helps the few at the expense of the many.

If agriculture is to continue to provide a livelihood for, say, a fifth of the population, special privileges will have to be taken from those who have long enjoyed them. If we are to have prosperity, we must have abundance from the factory and from the farm. And if this is to be, tariffs must be adjusted downward so as to conserve consumer purchasing power. True recovery also means that industrial monopoly must be controlled and that industry must produce goods in abundance. This will put men to work and with adequate wages provide a home market for agriculture. Lowering the tariffs will revive the farmers' foreign markets and at the same time by raising real incomes improve the home market.

Any given industry may, by means of a subsidy, be made prosperous temporarily. But such a course burdens consumers, depresses nonsubsidized industries and ultimately makes for general depression. Because of tariff protection, liberal charters, monopolistic privileges, a relative light tax burden, etc., all of which amounted to a subsidy, large-scale industry enjoyed unprecedented prosperity during the decade of the "twenties." To close students of what was taking place, the depression, ushered in with the financial crash of 1929, was no surprise. We might say that the farmer through the Triple A has been getting back a part of the subsidy that he has for years been contributing to industry. But lasting prosperity cannot be founded upon subsidy for either agri-

culture or industry. The farmers' subsidy is merely a panacea and not a corrective policy, but it seems unjust to condemn it as long as industry is watered at the public trough. The farmers' subsidy need not necessarily be continued in its present form. There is much to be said for the domestic allotment plan which would permit the farmer to grow all the cotton he pleases for export and allow him a subsidy on what he produces for domestic consumption, thus maintaining his share of the foreign market and also keeping employed those engaged in the cotton trade.

MONEY, CREDIT, AND THE PRICE LEVEL

A public policy designed to coordinate agriculture and industry must look well to the instruments and agencies of the monetary mechanism. Money, banking, and credit must be rationally controlled with a view of keeping the general price level reasonably stable. Since money, credit, and the price level are matters of central interest in all economic problems, the present analysis calls for a brief consideration of at least the basic principles of monetary policy.

Is a rising price level essential to prosperity? The wholesale commodity price level has increased from 60 to 84 per cent since March, 1933. Although this increase falls short of the president's expressed objective, even this is a rather drastic upward swing in prices. Yet, this price rise has not fully restored prosperity. Various factors have contributed to the price increase—gold devaluation, the agricultural curtailment policy, monopoly price fixing, especially under NRA, drought, etc. But a state of prosperity need not be inflationary; it is simply the full utilization of productive agents. While such a condition thrives upon credit, the mere availability of an abundance of money and credit by no means assures it.

The sooner the false notion that there can be no return to prosperity without inflation is dissipated, the better able will we be to attack the real problem. Even falling prices do not depress trade unless prices are falling more rapidly than the rate of production is increasing. These observations are made without denying the fact that prosperity is usually associated with a rising price level. The problem before us is the restoration of production, and there can be no genuine recovery through general curtailment of output. A falling price level

during a time of rapid technological progress and decreasing unit costs of production is not only theoretically consistent with business prosperity, but it is also perhaps the best means of perpetuating prosperity. Failure to heed this principle of price control in the twenties gave us a phenomenal, short-lived, profitless "prosperity".

The type of price control called for by this analysis is not simply a stabilized commodity price level. Obviously, it implies the application of price regulation to the large-scale decreasing-cost industries, especially those that have any semblance of monopoly. This might be done by some such agency as the Federal Trade Commission. Sustained production and flexible prices is ruinous to competitive agriculture when confronted by flexible production and inflexible prices in industry.

The total quantity of money and credit need not be increased indefinitely. If the quantity of money and credit is kept near the amount requisite for full employment of the productive factors, there would be an opportunity for money to perform its true function of measuring and exchanging values. In this connection, Hayek's idea that money should be neutral, i. e., relatively constant in quantity, instead of elastic, is highly suggestive. Elasticity of currency and credit has for at least a generation been regarded as a *sine qua non* in our financial policy. Yet, much mischief was done by using an elastic credit machine to finance the speculative boom that culminated in the financial debacle of 1929. Increasing output at decreasing unit cost denotes declining unit value which should be expressed in lower prices. With money and credit remaining constant and exerting a neutral effect on prices, purchasing power would be created automatically for the purchase of the increasing output of industry and agriculture, since real income would tend to rise as prices decline.

Stable prices with production increasing and costs declining breeds depression, since the larger output accrues to the few owners of industry. Wages and consumer purchasing power in general lag behind the output of goods. Increasing production, falling unit costs, and a stable price level from 1922-29 paved the way for the price collapse of 1929. Since stable prices gave the benefits of growing efficiency in the form of increased incomes to the producers, they overexpanded plants, resorted to excessive speculation, made loans of several

billion dollars abroad, and sold billions of dollars' worth of goods on installments. Yet, all these devices merely delayed the depression.

Whether the scientifically accurate trend is a rising, falling, or stable price level would depend upon whether the composite average unit cost of producing all commodities be increasing, decreasing or remaining constant. Under static conditions, unit costs in agriculture tend to increase with output, while the opposite cost trend is typical of manufacturing.

COSTS OF PRODUCTION, MONEY INCOMES, AND PRICES

If perfect competition prevailed, prices would tend to be established at cost of production. But ours is by no means a perfectly competitive system. Consequently, great disparity between cost and price is not an unusual condition. Instead of cost of production being the immutable law of competition governing price, as Adam Smith believed, cost of production is, or, more properly, should be regarded as the ideal of price-control policy to be applied where competition is ineffective. Cassel's volitional theory of pricing, i. e., that prices should be, rather than are, established at cost of production, affords what appears to be a tenable basis for monopoly price regulation.⁴

Money costs paid out by business concerns for the factors of production constitute the stream of money incomes, which are in turn the fund for the purchase of the output of agriculture and industry. When the total volume of money incomes received by those who purchase consumers' goods fails to keep pace with the total output of such goods, prices fall, unless temporarily maintained by additional bank credit. In the twenties, even with industrial production increasing, prices were supported by credit expansion and limitation of output. As costs were lowered, profits mounted. Farmers, unable to curtail their output, sold at falling prices and bought at constant prices. Wages also lagged behind industrial output and profits. Credit manipulation delayed but could not prevent the depression, that cumulative failure in consumer purchasing power made inevitable.

The productive capacity of industry would, if fully employed, greatly increase output, and in the absence of undue

⁴Gustav Cassel, *A Theory of Social Economy* (translation by J. McCabe, 1924), pp. 64-133.

credit expansion, lower both unit costs and prices. Consumer incomes would purchase not only a greater quantity of manufactured goods, but would also provide more purchasing power for the products of agriculture and trade.

The problem is how to keep the flow of purchasing power in tempo with production. If prices outrun incomes, business falters and trouble ensues. The possibility of keeping prices and incomes in proper relationship depends, to a large extent, upon our willingness and ability to maximize output in industry. Both jobs and additional purchasing power would thereby be provided. And, wherever there is any tendency toward decreasing costs, prices should be lowered with unit costs. This would improve the home market not only for industry but also for agriculture. The necessity for curtailing agricultural production would be lessened, and with tariffs moderated, would tend gradually to disappear.

The conditions required for an effective adjustment policy, then, are relatively free competition in agriculture and in other increasing cost industries; in the constant cost service industries; and volitional pricing applied by federal authority to prices in the decreasing-cost industries. Unless the right of collective bargaining is recognized, it will be necessary to have government control of wages also. With these conditions, credit should be made available in sufficient volume to keep the price level relatively stable, but with the possibility of a moderate trend either upward or downward, depending upon the average unit-cost trend.

It is obvious that a policy of managed money and prices that does not extend to the entire national credit system must suffer from serious limitations. Consequently, if we are to have a rational monetary policy, the first step should be the complete nationalization of commercial banking, preferably by charter, otherwise by making membership in the Federal Reserve System compulsory for all banks of deposit.

Credit policy in a period of prosperity must be concerned chiefly with the prevention of excessive speculation and over-expansion. The well-known devices of control, such as rediscount-rate, manipulation, and open-market operations by the Federal Reserve Banks, are effective if timely use is made of them. If the newly inaugurated policy of regulating security issues and supervising the stock exchange should prove effective, it would serve as a powerful check on speculation and

reckless expansion. The total quantity of credit may be checked in a period of cumulative prosperity by raising the rediscount rate and resorting to open-market selling. The control devices, if used, are far more effective in checking a boom than in promoting recovery from depression.

Had all banks been subject to national control when the depression first loomed, steps could have been taken which might have effectively checked overexpansion. The defect of a dual banking system should be remedied before the next depression threatens, so that concerted measures may be taken in time to avert disaster.

The problem of credit control, even with a nationally unified credit structure, requires economic statesmanship of a high order. But with the nationalization of all banks of deposit, a concerted attack on the problem would be possible.

RECOVERY DEPENDENT ON MASS PRODUCTION

In short, lasting prosperity in agriculture and industry depends less, in the long run, on what we do either for the farmer or for the industrialist directly than what we do toward establishing controls that will promote mass production, first in industry, and ultimately in agriculture as well. A nation increases its income by producing not fewer but more goods and services. As production is resumed, incomes must be distributed more equitably. If we are to have a healthy agriculture and a safe economic order, tariffs must be moderated, the tax burden shifted from consumption to those more able to bear it, and monopolistic and other special privileges curtailed. The holding company should be effectively controlled or abolished. We are impelled to exercise more effective public control over industries, which technology has already regimented internally. This is a logical necessity if agriculture is to remain competitive and productive. When the prices of what he buys are brought down proportionately, the cotton farmer can produce ten-cent or even five-cent cotton and prosper, and also retain his natural advantage in the foreign market. Such a program, even though it has little to offer entrenched monopoly except a safer social order, is in the interest of industry as well as agriculture.

MOBILITY OF POPULATION IN ASSUMPTION AND JEFFERSON DAVIS PARISHES, LOUISIANA

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Social mobility is coming to be recognized as one of the most important influences conditioning the behavior of man. On the one hand, it seems to foster that plasticity, open-mindedness, and versatility which are characteristic of leadership in general and genius in particular. As Sorokin¹ and others have shown, there seems to be a definite tendency for high mobility and high social position to go together. But on the other hand, high mobility seems to be a contributing factor in many of the most serious social problems confronting us today. For example, the much-criticized institutional pattern so characteristic of the cotton region seems to spring directly from the excessive territorial mobility of croppers. Also, in the recent depression, the drifting about of the unemployed became so acute that a series of temporary measures were devised to cope with it. We need only mention the Transient Camps and Civilian Conservation Corps. Other attempts of the present administration to deal with problems involving territorial and/or occupational mobility include rural rehabilitation, re-location of the population now residing in submarginal agricultural areas, and the subsistence homesteads program. In any aspect of our social life, this factor of mobility is certain to manifest itself; it always seems to appear as one of the elements in our social problems, and is always one of the factors which must be considered in the suggested reforms. For this reason we need a much more thorough-going and comprehensive knowledge than we now have of the nature, extent, and effects of this factor. Especially do we need more information concerning its interrelationships and associations with other social phenomena. The collection, tabulation, and correlation of these materials will require a great deal of painstaking labor. But, as in so many other phases of sociology, this essential work must be done before any genuine understanding of social phenomena can be had.

This paper deals with social mobility in the State of Louisiana. Mobility is an extremely broad subject and one which

¹See P. A. Sorokin, *Social Mobility*, *passim*.

can be attacked from many angles. Consequently, it has been necessary to confine our remarks to particular phases of the subject, attempting only to cover as much of the ground as is justified in a short paper, and considering only the aspects of mobility upon which specific information could be secured. Several considerations, which will be outlined below, caused us to limit the subject to an analysis and comparison of territorial and occupational mobility in the sugar and rice areas of Louisiana.

Confronted with the broad subject of social mobility, and aware of the many other phases of social life to which it might be related, we cast about for the aspects peculiarly significant in Louisiana. The territory to survey was broad, since within this state's borders are to be found practically all the variety of social phenomena characteristic of the other southern states, plus many racial, cultural, and industrial elements which are peculiar to Louisiana. Two very sharply differentiated patterns of life are found in the cane and rice areas. Social organization of the cane area, which is built about the large plantation and sugar house, is unique in the United States although similar to the pattern in the West Indies. Life in the rice area is in sharp contrast with this. It is an area in which the fairly large-sized single family farm predominates, and resembles the Middle West in many ways. It is particularly fitting that an analysis of mobility in Louisiana should begin by contrasting the situation in the cane and rice areas, since Louisiana is the only state which is an important producer of both sugar and rice. Furthermore, both are located in the southern half of the state, the region in which the French influence is very strong. This makes the contrasts in their physical environment and in their cultural heritage much less than would be the case with the other major regions of the state, such as the upland and delta cotton areas and the strawberry section.

Fortunately for our purposes, the Federal Emergency Relief Administration last year conducted a survey in representative parishes of the cane and rice areas. The selections, which were made in consultation with the members of the State Agricultural Experiment Station, were Assumption Parish for sugar cane and Jefferson Davis Parish for rice. The Federal Emergency Relief Administration survey included 100 relief households from Jefferson Davis Parish and

125 from Assumption. These households were selected by taking names at regular intervals from an alphabetical list of the relief cases in the parishes.² The study also included non-relief cases, 207 from Jefferson Davis and 244 from Assumption. These non-relief cases were selected by taking the two non-relief households geographically closest to each relief household. This made a total of 676 households, of which 307 were in Jefferson Davis and 369 in Assumption Parish. On the basis of race, the sample for Jefferson Davis included 72 Negro households, and that for Assumption 89.

Among the data secured from each case was a record of the occupational history of the head of the household from the time he first secured employment until October 1933. The interviewers tried to secure complete data concerning every change in occupation, industry and residence. The schedules used in this survey provided information of fundamental importance for our analysis, enabling us to gauge the mobility of population in each area and to make comparisons between the two.

For analytical purposes, three simple indices of territorial mobility were decided upon: (1) the percentage of the heads of households who had resided only in the parish in which they first obtained employment; (2) the percentage of the heads of households who had resided in states other than Louisiana; and (3) the percentage who had spent part of their lives in other countries. On the occupational basis, the heads of households were grouped into five classes: laborers (of whom most were farm laborers), farm tenants, farm owners, "swampers"³ and the business and professional group. As stated above, information concerning the race, and whether the household was on relief rolls or not was also available for each case. Let us now turn to the results of the tabulations.

The percentage of the heads of households who had never lived or worked outside the parish in which they were first employed was 62.3 in Assumption (the cane parish) and 40.7 in Jefferson Davis (the rice parish). This indicates a low degree of mobility in both areas and a marked differential between the two. As reflected by this index, the lower mobil-

²In Jefferson Davis Parish all names of those residing in Jennings, classed as an urban center, were eliminated before the sample was taken.

³Swampers refers to those who gain a livelihood from swamp industries such as logging, mossing, trapping, fishing, etc.

ity in the cane as compared with the rice area manifested in all five occupational groups, was exhibited by both whites and Negroes, and was true of both relief and non-relief cases.⁴

The percentage of heads of households who had resided out of the State showed the same tendency to a marked extent, this percentage being only 2.9 for Assumption Parish as compared to 15.0 in the rice-producing parish, Jefferson Davis. This differential was likewise present for each occupational group, for both races and for relief and non-relief cases.⁵

⁴The data are as follows:

Occupation, Race, and Relief History	Total number of heads of households		Residence and work confined to one parish			
	Assump- tion	Jefferson Davis	Assump- tion		Jefferson Davis	
			number	per cent	number	per cent
Total	369	307	230	62	125	41
White	280	235	177	63	97	41
Colored	89	72	53	59	28	39
White laborers ..	101	108	62	61	24	22
Negro laborers ..	88	65	50	57	28	43
Farm tenants ...	38	19	27	71	8	42
Farm owners	32	21	23	72	11	52
Swampers	74	3	44	60	0	0
Business and						
Professional ...	39	91	24	62	53	36
Relief	125	100	63	50	39	39
Non-relief	244	207	167	68	86	42

⁵The data are as follows:

Occupation, Race, and Relief History	Total number of heads of households		Resided outside of the state			
	Assump- tion	Jefferson Davis	Assump- tion		Jefferson Davis	
			number	per cent	number	per cent
Total	369	307	11	3	46	15
White	250	235	5	2	38	16
Colored	89	72	6	7	8	11
White laborers ..	101	108	2	2	18	17
Negro laborers ..	88	65	6	7	7	11
Tenants	38	19	0	0	1	5
Owners	32	21	1	3	3	14
Swampers	74	3	1	1	0	0
Business and						
Professional ...	39	91	1	3	17	19
Relief	125	100	8	6	9	9
Non-relief	244	207	3	1	37	18

The percentage of those who had resided outside of the United States was relatively small, being only 1.9 in Assumption and 3.9 in Jefferson Davis. Nevertheless, this difference is important as it indicates lower mobility of the population in Assumption Parish. Here again the differential is present for each occupational group, for both races, and for the non-relief cases.⁶

It seems very evident, as gauged by the proportion of heads of households who have never resided outside the Parish in which they were born, and by the proportions who have resided in other states and other countries, that territorial mobility is much greater in the rice section of Louisiana than in the sugar area. This is consistently the case for all occupational groups, for both whites and Negroes, and for non-relief as well as relief cases.

For the purpose of analyzing and comparing occupational mobility, the present or last occupation of heads of households was first grouped into the five classes listed above: laborer, farm tenant, farm owner, swamper, and the business and professional class. Next the average number of occupations engaged in by the members of each group was calculated.

⁶The data are as follows:

Occupation, Race, and Relief History	Total number of heads of households		Resided outside of the United States			
	Assump- tion	Jefferson Davis	Assump- tion		Jefferson Davis	
			number	per cent	number	per cent
Total	369	307	7	2	12	4
White	280	235	7	3	10	4
Colored	89	72	0	0	2	3
White laborers ..	101	108	1	1	9	8
Negro laborers ..	88	65	0	0	2	3
Tenants	38	19	0	0	0	0
Owners	32	21	0	0	0	0
Swampers	74	3	5	7	0	0
Business and Professional ---	39	91	1	3	1	1
Relief	125	100	4	3	2	2
Non-relief	244	207	3	1	10	5

The data are given in the following table.

AVERAGE NUMBER OF OCCUPATIONS

Occupation, Race, and Relief History	Assumption	Jefferson Davis
Total -----	2.06	2.46
White -----	2.15	2.43
Colored -----	1.75	2.58
White laborers -----	2.47	2.75
Negro laborers -----	1.72	2.54
Tenants -----	1.84	1.53
Owners -----	1.75	1.52
Swampers -----	2.39	3.
Business and Professional -----	2.51	2.67
Relief -----	2.11	2.66
Non-relief -----	1.41	2.37

The heads of households in Assumption Parish averaged 2.06 occupations compared to 2.46 in Jefferson Davis Parish. Here again we find that greater mobility is associated with the production of rice. The significance of the association is increased by the fact that these differentials are constant for white and colored, relief and non-relief, and for all occupational groups except owners and tenants, where the differences were too slight to have any significance.

The data and discussion given above have concerned the relative mobility in the cane and rice areas. The information presented also enables us to contrast the territorial and occupational mobility of the various occupational classes, the two races, and the relief and non-relief households. We shall make comparisons among these with respect to territorial mobility first. A larger proportion of the whites than of the Negroes had never been out of the parish. Likewise, higher proportions of the Negroes had lived in two parishes, and three or more parishes. But the differential is not so great for those who lived in two parishes, and still less for those who had lived in three or more parishes. This might seem to justify the conclusion that territorial mobility is less among whites than among Negroes. However, when the percentage of those who have spent part of their lives outside of the state is considered, our data show this to be greater for whites. This is also the case for those who have spent part of their life in another country.

Comparisons of mobility among the different occupational groups show the least territorial mobility among the owner

class, with the tenants running a close second. There is some indication that the laborers are the most mobile class. However, the data are not conclusive on this point. The data show very conclusively, however, that the mobility of the class receiving relief is greater than that of the population not on the relief rolls.

We shall now turn to a comparison of the occupational mobility of the various occupational groups, the two races, and the non-relief and relief cases. There seems to be hardly any difference between the occupational mobility of whites and Negroes, although that of the whites may be slightly above that of the Negroes. Tenants stand out as the least mobile of all occupational groups, while the business and professional groups show the greatest occupational mobility. Comparisons on the basis of relief show much more occupational shifting in the relief than in the non-relief group.

In closing, we shall give a brief recapitulation of our findings. This study analyzed the mobility of the heads of 676 households living in the cane and rice areas of Louisiana. Our data show that the population of the rice area is characterized by higher mobility, both territorial and occupational, than the population of the cane area. The evidence seems to show that Negroes shift about within a limited area more than whites, but that long moves involving interstate and international migrations are more prevalent among the white population. Our data seem to show no pronounced differences between the races in occupational shifting, although the mobility among whites may be slightly above that among the Negroes. Of all the occupational groups, territorial mobility is greatest among the laborers and the business and professional men. It is least among farm owners and farm tenants. The rankings in occupational mobility are similar to the rankings in territorial mobility. It is very significant that the relief population has shifted both residence and occupation more frequently than the non-relief population.

SOME OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING CONFEDERATE ORDNANCE DURING 1861

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This paper has as its purpose only the sketching of certain interesting features of the source of supply and the maintenance of the arms and ammunition of the Confederate army during the very early period of the war. It does not propose to show, in any measure, the whole of the sources, nor all of the interesting features of supply for the short period which it covers. Certain commonly understood features of supply, such as the seizure of arsenals and posts by the states, are merely mentioned. Only a few incidents are chosen from certain phases of the story as representative of a greater number which might be given in detail. In the main, the paper covers incidental situations during 1861 and only previews incidents of the later period, where completeness of the topic is essential.

It was no easy task to furnish an army, when there was on hand no infantry accoutrements, no cavalry arms or equipment, no artillery, and above all, no ammunition; nothing save small arms,¹ and these almost wholly smooth bore which were altered from flint to percussion.

At the head of the Ordnance Department the new government placed Josiah Gorgas of Alabama. In charge of the Powder division the government placed G. W. Rains to assist Mr. Gorgas. Through the war Mr. Gorgas, later General Gorgas, found that Ordnance was to be secured from three main sources: those taken over from the federal government, those brought in by the states and the men themselves, and those from foreign importations, supplemented by miscellaneous lesser ones.

When the Confederate government was organized, General Gorgas found his available supply distributed at Richmond, Virginia; Fayetteville, North Carolina; Charleston, South Carolina; Augusta, Georgia; Mt. Vernon, Alabama; and at Baton Rouge, Louisiana. The total supply amounted to approximately 15,000 rifles and 120,000 muskets in addition.²

¹Gorgas, W. C., *Personal Notes on Confederate Ordnance*, p. 2.

²*Ibid.*, p. 1.

At Richmond something like 60,000 worthless flint muskets were found and at Baton Rouge 10,000 old Hall's rifles and carbines. When Brigadier General Twiggs surrendered his Texas supplies to the Confederate army a large number of rifles and considerable materials were added. General Gorgas is authority for the statement that not more than 150,000 serviceable arms were all that were available. A few pistols but no revolvers might be added to the list. Included in the above list, but mostly of no use, were guns Secretary Floyd had distributed to the South and to the North just before he resigned from President Buchanan's cabinet. The charge that Secretary Floyd had been partial to the South is probably not warranted, because neither side had wanted these guns.

The matter of ammunition was of much consequence. The supply was almost negligible. Most of what was available was left over from the Mexican War, and it is doubtful whether there were a million rounds of cartridges or 60,000 pounds of powder anywhere in the South. What powder there was was cannon powder and not usable for small arms.

Of artillery there were no batteries of serviceable field pieces. A few old guns mounted on carriages, fabricated about the time of the war of 1812, comprised the entire supply.³ A few small guns, belonging to private companies, were finally found.

Since a considerable proportion of the southern arms were secured from Europe, it is necessary to give some notice to the general methods used to secure these. The man most responsible for securing and bringing arms and supplies from Europe was Mr. Caleb Huse, a graduate of West Point, and at the outbreak of the war, a professor in the University of Alabama.⁴ On the day after the attack on Fort Sumter, Caleb Huse left for Europe. He had been appointed by the government as special agent to go to the markets of Europe and to negotiate for arms and munitions for the Confederate army. He had been chosen because of his peculiar fitness for the position; he was an expert in the manufacture of arms, had had military training, and was a skillful business diplo-

³*Ibid.*, p. 2.

⁴*Ibid.*, p. 5.

mat.⁵ His experience in arms and with foreign business methods prevented his buying inferior arms, and at the same time, gave him oftentimes the chance to buy good equipment, where officers of the United States were unable to negotiate with foreign agents because of their lack of acquaintance with procedure.

The supply of arms secured in Europe from the beginning was insufficient. The nations of Europe had only recently equipped themselves. The English had adopted the Enfield, which was also used by Austria. Prussia had a breech loader. France had a muzzle loader, but it was of an inferior grade. Few arms were for sale anywhere in Europe. Shortly after Huse's arrival in Europe, Austria made a change in her gunpowder to meet competition and, of necessity, had to change guns. An intermediary proposed to Huse that he buy these Austrian guns, but he did not believe the Austrian Government would sell. However, he went to Vienna and managed to contract for 100,000 rifles of the latest pattern and for 10 batteries of six pieces each of field artillery complete and ready for service.⁶ Likewise he obtained a supply of ammunition to be delivered on board ship at Hamburg.

The United States minister, Motley, protested in vain at the action of Austria but was told that the making of arms was an important industry of Austria and that they had offered to sell them to the United States earlier; furthermore, the Confederate states as a belligerent nation was a lawful buyer. Motley then offered to buy the entire shipment, but Austria would not change her trade. The arms were delivered at Hamburg and shipped to Bermuda.

The landing and the shipping of these arms after their purchase was an interesting piece of work difficult to the extreme.

After being secured and shipped in through the federal blockade, the question of distribution taxed the strategy of the Ordnance department. Judah P. Benjamin, Secretary of War, was early besieged with requests from every section of his army. He simply received the requests and passed them on to the Ordnance department for the best attention possible. The seriousness of these requests is reflected by the letters

⁵McMaster, J. B., *A History of the American People During Lincoln's Administration*, p. 120.

⁶Huse, Caleb, *Supplies for the Confederate Army*, p. 27.

of the officials. On September 17, 1861 Mr. Benjamin, at Richmond, wrote to A. S. Johnston, "The President has presented your request for small arms supposed by you to have arrived per Bermuda and Savannah. The whole number received was 1800 and we purchased of the owners 1700, making in all 3500 Enfield rifles, of which we have been compelled to allow the governor of Georgia 1000 for army troops to repel attacks at Brunswick. Of the remaining 2500 I am sending you 1000, using 1500 for a regiment which has for several months been waiting for arms. The Arsenal here is turning out 1000 per month."⁷

Instances of impatience are sometimes noted in the letters. On January 13, 1861, Gill Shorter wrote to Mr. Benjamin that there were 25,000 stands of guns waiting in Havana and closed his letter by reminding the secretary that at the beginning of the war Alabama gave up all her private arms and that it was time that the secretary did something toward replacing them.⁸

Attempts were made to make connections in Mexico. On October 24, 1861, General P. O. Herbert, the commanding general of Texas wrote to Mr. Benjamin: "... The department is woefully deficient in powder, lead, and munitions of all kinds. I have directed the chief of ordnance to make arrangements with individuals to obtain, if possible, arms and ammunition from Mexico, giving cotton in exchange."⁹ On October 27, 1861, he again writes that arrangements have been perfected whereby munitions may be obtained from Mexico.¹⁰

The shipments which were always especially appreciated were those containing the Enfield rifles; and sometime along with these special guns were entirely acceptable. A letter written by Mr. F. H. Pickens to Secretary Walker, April 1, 1861, is enlightening on this subject. He writes: "... I have four hundred fine Enfield rifles that have been practiced at nine hundred yards ... Also there has just arrived on the bar, a fine rifled cannon from Liverpool of the latest make, (Blakey Gun) an improvement upon the Armstrong of steel rolls or coils with an elevation of $7\frac{1}{2}$ degrees per mile. It throws a shell of twelve pound shot with the accuracy of a

⁷*War of the Rebellion Record*, I. IV, p. 430.

⁸*Ibid.*, I, VI, p. 803.

⁹*Ibid.*, I, VI, p. 823.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, I, VI, p. 823.

duelling pistol and only one and one half pounds of powder. Such, they write me, is this gun, and I hope to have it in position tonight."¹¹

News of the arrival of European guns traveled fast. A letter written by General Polk at Columbus, Kentucky, November 14, 1861, to Secretary Benjamin stated that: "... I have just heard of an arrival of arms and ammunitions at Savannah. Can you send me 4,000 or 5,000 stands of arms and 20,000 pounds of powder?" By return message Mr. Benjamin replied: "I have ordered 4,500 Enfield rifles sent to you, this being half of all that were received by the recent arrival from England. You see you are not forgotten."¹²

Another source of material for munitions, in addition to the arms received from the captured arsenals and the arms shipped in from Europe, was that great amount of guns furnished by the individual soldiers themselves. Immediately after each of the states took over the arsenals in their respective territories, they tendered that equipment to the use of the Confederate States Army.¹³ Having given up their regular supply of arms, the individual states were encouraged to raise their own troops and to procure arms for the soldiers. In a letter Secretary Walker writes to G. Gannut as follows: "... The War Department is gratified to hear of the efforts of Tennessee in raising rifle regiments. Too much energy cannot be devoted to the enlistment of troops and the procuring of arms. . . . The manufacture of munitions of war such as you mention under the direction of the state of Tennessee is highly approved and the government would gladly encourage and promote such manufacturing by every means."¹⁴

It was entirely evident that by the latter part of 1861 most of the available arms in the states had been taken from the hands of individuals. On September 31, 1861, General Bragg wrote to General Johnston in substance: "I fear as our extreme southern country has been stripped of both men and arms."¹⁵

The state of Tennessee passed laws to impress the arms

¹¹*Ibid.*, I, I, p. 293.

¹²*Ibid.*, I, IV, p. 551.

¹³*Ibid.*, I, IV, pp. 392, 403.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, I, IV, p. 375.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, I, IV, p. 373.

of the state and to pay the individuals for their arms. Efforts were made to collect the arms and to adapt them for military uses through the ordnance shops at Nashville.¹⁶ A short time later Mr. Benjamin made a ruling that the Confederate Government would pay for the private arms when taken from citizens of the state.¹⁷

Along with the lack of arms, the variety of the few which they did have was interesting. Late in July, 1861, William Withers wrote to Secretary Walker in part: "... Many companies of cavalry have tendered their services. They propose to arm themselves with shotguns and revolvers."¹⁸

It is but natural, under circumstances of such intense effort, that guns of all kinds would be gathered, but certainly many of those thus gathered were of little use. A report made by John Gregg of the Texas Volunteers upon his reporting for duty at Hopkinsville, Kentucky, with his men to W. W. Mackall, indicates the kind of guns and the condition they were in. A part of the report indicates the following: Van Zandt's company, 13 double barrel shotguns, and 16 rifles, in good condition, also 9 double barrel shotguns and 25 rifles out of repair; W. B. Hill's company, 19 double barrel shotguns, and 8 rifles, good, and 20 rifles and 14 double barrel shotguns out of repair.¹⁹

Since the arms which had been secured were of such a variety, the question of repair and rebuilding assumed a place of importance in the building of the army. Within the limits of the Confederate States there were no arsenals where arms had been constructed. No arsenal except that at Fayetteville, North Carolina, had a single machine larger than a foot lathe. Such arsenals were merely depots for storage. All the work of preparation of materials had been carried on in the North. Not a particle of construction work had been done in the South. There were no workmen skilled in these arts. No powder except blasting powder had been made; there was no saltpeter or sulphur in store in any point except in the North. There was no lead nor any mines except in the northern limit of the confederacy. Only one cannon factory existed. Copper

¹⁶Davis, Jefferson, *Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government*, I, p. 407.

¹⁷*War of Rebellion Record*, I, VII, p. 770.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, I, IV, p. 374.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, I, IV, p. 525.

was produced only in very small amounts, and there was no machinery for rolling bar iron south of Richmond and not a good blast furnace anywhere.

Two sets of machinery for the making of a certain type of rifle had been seized at Harper's ferry, but these were never of much use because of lack of skilled operators. The repairing of guns was of much greater immediate importance than the manufacture.

The reasons for the unfitness of most of the guns are found in a letter, descriptive of the guns from the Texas companies. W. H. Warren, Ordnance officer from Knoxville, December 13, 1861, said in part, "The guns are of different size and bore which render it impossible to get ammunition suitable for them. Many of the locks are in bad condition and some even worthless. Some are without rammers and none are fit to use. The springs on the bayonets are of iron."²⁰

Major General Polk wrote Mr. Gorgas October 14, 1861, that he had ordered General Hunt, Ordnance officer of Tennessee, to put up a shop in Memphis for the alteration and repair of guns. Withal, there was a note of optimism, despite the desperation.

In a similar vein, a letter from William Richardson Hunt, captain of Ordnance, indicates a phase of the work done. It says in part, "Machinery from Hilman Brothers on the Tennessee River has been secured. The dies for locks and nipples are being made here and can be turned out in large quantities. A foundry and shop in this city (Memphis) can turn out stocks at the rate of 100 to 200 per day and we can thus have a weapon equal in all respects to the Mississippi rifle while not so heavy. Also two machines for rifling cannon will be in operation this week, and if successful, they can turn out 6 pieces daily. Contracts may be made at other points for casting and boring while rifling could be done here whenever required."²¹

Though apparently of fairly efficient equipment, there was always complaint of the service from the arsenals and repair shops. The following is illustrative as W. H. Carroll writes Secretary Benjamin his woes. It says in part: "... After the president's order appointing me as Brigadier General, I expected to have my entire brigade armed in twenty

²⁰*Ibid.*, I, VII, p. 767.

²¹*Ibid.*, I, IV, p. 387.

days as I had taken precaution to get arms while I organized it. But when I received an order to advance on November 3, not a single gun was ready. Indications of immediate outbreak in East Tennessee made me make application in every direction for guns of any description. I finally succeeded in getting from the Memphis arsenal about 400 flint lock muskets, rifles, and double barrel shotguns. 200 of those I left at Nashville were sent me some days ago but were so imperfectly repaired as to be wholly unfit for use, today, December 13, 1861."²²

In the manufacture of cannon and other heavy artillery, the Confederate States used every available source of supply. The Tredgar Works at Richmond were probably the most important source, but there were others of consequence. On July 9, 1861, the following letter was written by Mr. Yergen of Corinth, Mississippi, to W. P. Harris, and a copy of it found its way to the president. It said in part: "... At Chattanooga is a foundry engaged in casting cannon, which could easily be seized by the people and converted to that use for themselves. I found two six pounders and one twelve pounder nearly complete, for where intended I did not learn."²³

Apparently the owners of some of the foundries were stubborn and wanted to get the best of the government in regard to sales or the use of their machinery. An instance of this kind is shown in a letter which General Lovell wrote Secretary Benjamin, January 15, 1862. It said: "... Among other things, the Belleville foundry has two lathes large enough to bore two inches, but the foundry is shut up, and the parties will neither sell here, nor lend the works, hoping to compel the government to buy. The guns which I have collected number about nine hundred, about half of them double barrel shotguns. The rifles have been cut to equal length and bored out to the caliber of the old United States Rifles, .54."²⁴

Not only in the matter of small arms, cannon for field work and siege guns, was there a shortage, but troubles came in securing ammunition for all of these. Powder of good quality was especially difficult to procure at all times. When it could be secured, it was often of inferior grade. The chief ingredient, saltpeter, was not to be had in sufficient quantities

²²*Ibid.*, I, VII, p. 765.

²³*Ibid.*, I, IV, p. 369.

²⁴*Ibid.*, I, VI, p. 807.

to save embarrassment. Over and over again, the cry for saltpeter was heard during the war. The following letter from General Polk to Secretary Benjamin is typical of many others. It says in part: "... We are greatly pressed for want of powder. Saltpeter, the article chiefly needed for its manufacture, is now being delivered in increasing quantities from the mines in Arkansas, but the work does not go on as it might, nor will it, until the government makes a contract with parties of capital and character to furnish it."²⁵

With the powder mills, as with the gun factories, the output was apparently never up to the standard. On October 4, 1861, at Columbus, Kentucky, A. S. Johnston wrote to S. Cooper, replying to a request for a considerable amount of powder. He said in part: "... Nashville is the only source of supply for my department. At present the capacity of the mills is at a maximum of 400 pounds per day. (They promised 1000 pounds per day). This is not only prospective but uncertain; I am aware of a deficiency of powder."²⁶

Not only was the saltpeter hard to get, but it often was of poor quality and mixed with a great deal of foreign matter. On November 8, 1861, General Lovell complained to Mr. Benjamin that it was difficult to get saltpeter from Augusta, and he was that day working on the last few pounds. The last remaining supply had been shipped out so that there remained almost none for protection for the men at New Orleans.²⁷

Along with the question of the supply of saltpeter, were questions of sulphur and of charcoal. The powder was constituted of approximately 75% of saltpeter, and the remaining 25% of charcoal and sulphur in various mixtures. Major Raines visited General Lovell's factories at New Orleans and reported at that time a bare sufficiency of sulphur and charcoal.²⁸

Some sulphur was imported from the Indies, some from Mexico, and some came from sources in the Gulf States. A note from the port of Mobile, December 28, 1861, indicates that some sulphur came from the islands. It said in part: "... A small vessel from Havana loaded with supplies for us attempted to run the blockade the other day. She had a hard

²⁵*Ibid.*, I, IV, p. 455.

²⁶*Ibid.*, I, IV, p. 436.

²⁷*Ibid.*, I, VI, p. 766.

²⁸*Ibid.*, I, VI, p. 776.

time getting in, but finally succeeded. Among other things she was loaded with 150 bags of coffee, and some sulphur and other small stores.²⁹

Not only was the making of sufficient powder a difficult task, but the danger of a blowup was considerable. A number of instances of such took place during the war. One of these is typical and is shown in General Lovell's report of December 29, 1861, to Secretary Benjamin. In part it says: "At twelve o'clock last night, Hobert and Foster's powder mill in the old Marine hospital exploded. One charge of powder, 4,000 pounds was in the drying room, and the same time, 4,000 pounds was in the cylinders. I had just taken out 4,000 pounds which was in a separate compartment and not destroyed. The mill I brought over from Handsborough will be up in twenty days. This together with the city mill should give 2,500 to 3,000 pounds per day. Hobert and Foster will rebuild at once."³⁰

The problem of lead was likewise a serious one. After the first supply was mixed up it was difficult to replace because of the lack of organization, and the shortage became acute. On September 28, 1861, Governor John Pettus of Mississippi wrote to Albert Sidney Johnston: "I have a number of hands employed in making ammunition for cannon, muskets, and rifles and they are nearly out of lead. Could you aid me in procuring any quantity from one to one hundred thousand pounds? I need some now in preparing ammunition for rifled cannon."³¹

In the early part of the war considerable lead was secured. More than 400,000 pounds of lead was taken from window weights, lead pipe, and other sources in Charleston and Mobile alone. (Gorgas Notes)

The protection of such sources of supply as mentioned above early became a part of the policy of the Southern Government. In a letter written December 31, 1861, Colonel L. Hebert was especially enjoined to look out for the protection of the lead mines. The letter said in part: "... A contract has been entered in with parties in Memphis, to work the lead mines near Granby, Missouri. It is understood that the parties from Kansas frequently visit that portion of the country,

²⁹*Ibid.*, I, VI, p. 789.

³⁰*Ibid.*, I, VI, p. 790.

³¹*Ibid.*, I, IV, p. 431.

and it is apprehended that they may interfere with the work of the miners and carry off the lead. The chief of ordnance has requested protection for the West."³²

The chief trouble for the Ordnance Department of the Confederate Army during the early period seemed to be one of lack of organization and of efficient service. Outside of the lack of good material of a general nature they seemed to have trouble in getting what they did have in usable condition and in getting it where it was most needed when it was needed.

Thus the first year of the war passed with the South growing in strength, even as a result of its obstacles. The ensuing years of the war saw the program of repair and construction expand to almost unbelievable proportions. Just before the war closed the Tredegar works had made its first 12 inch gun with water cooling jacket, a powder mill superior to most any in the continent had just been opened, and shops for the repair of arms were beginning to carry on. Had the war not closed when it did, the matter of Ordnance would have been a very different story.

³²*Ibid.*, VI, VIII, p. 726.

A STATE MONOPOLY OF ELECTRIC LIGHT AND POWER

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In a previous issue of this quarterly the remarkable record of the government monopoly of electric light and power (Usinas Electricas) in Uruguay was discussed.¹ It was demonstrated that in the period up to 1929 most of the dangers of state industry had been avoided. Although a tradition of competent civil service was lacking, the Usinas Electricas was able to attract and retain the services of a fine staff which aimed at maximum profits in much the same way as the management of a private monopoly would. Although the inefficiency of Uruguayan government employees had been notorious and the state-socialist party generally truckled to labor, nevertheless the Usinas Electricas were not over-considerate of their laborers. The enterprise did not lag in adopting the latest improvements in equipment and developed a group of native engineers which maintained a high level of technical efficiency. Excessive political pressure was avoided by the excellence of the basic laws and by the desire of the government to make the Usinas Electricas a model for the larger socialistic adventure in which it was engaged. The political stability of the period also aided greatly.

The writers in this article conclude the study by considering the record of the Usinas Electricas during the depression.

RATES AND SERVICE

The policy of stabilizing lighting rates for the capital at a level lower than that of any other large city on the continent (excluding those operating hydro-electric plants) was continued in the period 1929-1935. There had been no change in the rate of U\$0.12 (Uruguayan money) per kilowatt hour for private lighting service during the World War when fuel costs rose enormously, and there was none during the depression when depreciation of the peso largely advanced cost of im-

¹"State Ownership in Uruguay," *The Southwestern Social Science Quarterly*, June, 1935. Through an unfortunate error the name of one of the authors, Mr. Collado, was omitted.

ported fuel and equipment. By 1931-32 the cost per kilowatt hour produced had increased to U\$0.0357 from U\$0.0257 in 1929-30 and the cost per kilowatt hour consumed to U\$0.0407 from U\$0.0298, and the situation continued to grow worse. In the same years the rates on public lighting and private lighting were unchanged while the power rate increased only slightly from U\$0.036 to U\$0.038. A comparison of the rates in Buenos Aires and Montevideo furnishes the best indication of the benefit that has accrued to Montevideo from the state enterprise. Converting into United States currency at exchange rates as of December 27, 1935, the rates are as follows: for private lighting, Buenos Aires US\$0.077, Montevideo US\$0.058; for domestic use, Buenos Aires US\$0.072, Montevideo US\$0.015 for general domestic use and US\$0.01 for kitchen appliances.² Power rates in Buenos Aires vary so widely with individual contracts that comparison with those of Montevideo is impracticable.

Rates in the interior have continued to be a weak point in the record of the administration and a sore spot which provoked widespread discontent. In the autumn of 1935 dissatisfaction reached a point where "electricity strikes" were held in some of the towns during which no use was made of electrical equipment. The Usinas still defends itself with the argument that the interior plants even at the high rates are operating at a loss and that the necessarily small consumption makes higher rates than those of Montevideo inevitable.³ Opponents emphasize the political antagonism of the interior to the state-socialist party as a cause of discrimination and point out quite correctly the failure to meet the original purpose of the monopoly, namely, "buena luz y barata en todas partes aunque el estado pierda" (cheap and good light everywhere

²We have used the directed exchange rate for Argentina and the free exchange rate for Uruguay. Average consumption per month in Buenos Aires has been based on Montevideo averages; meter charges have been included.

³For instance, in 1931-32, with a fixed capital of U\$16,434,000 (end of period), the Montevideo plant served 168,677 subscribers at a gross profit of U\$2,654,000. The interior plants with a fixed capital of U\$6,383,000 served 39,594 subscribers at a gross loss of U\$175,000. Consumption in Montevideo was 121,746,000 kilowatt hours, in the interior 11,066,703 kilowatt hours. Thus in the interior investment is larger per unit of sales and per subscriber; average consumption of subscribers is lower than in Montevideo.

even though the state may lose money). Although adequate data for comparison with rates in the interior of Argentina are not available, a superficial comparison leads the writers to suspect that if any advantage rests with the interior Uruguayan plants as against the privately owned enterprises in Argentina, it is very small and not universal. The varying rate bases and the difference in quality of service make it difficult to compare official rates with those charged by Uruguayan private plants before they were taken over by the government, but the statement issued by the Usinas Electricas in 1927 implies that the public has not always benefitted by a rate reduction from the change in ownership: "We do not claim that the private companies charge more than the state plants; we can only assert that the state plants do not charge more than the private and that in eight cases we charge less than the cheapest private service in existence."⁴

One of the major changes in policy during the depression has been the speeding up of expansion in the interior. The earlier policy of waiting until demand was sufficient to minimize the chances of loss was loudly denounced during the twenties. In 1927 only 26 out of 77 towns and cities were being served by the Usinas Electricas, 11 by privately owned plants, and 40 were lacking in facilities. Of the 26 towns served by the Usinas, 6 had previously enjoyed private service. In other words, in fifteen years the government has extended facilities to only 20 towns. And in one quarter of these towns power facilities were not yet available, although the legislators had originally intended that the Usinas should take the lead in making industrial development possible. In the two years, 1927-28 and 1928-29, service was opened in five more towns. Then, both in response to public demand and in evidence of a less conservative policy, 23 more towns were provided with service in the three years from 1929-30 to 1931-32.⁵ At pres-

⁴Administracion General de las Usinas Electricas, *La Gestion de las Usinas Electricas del Estado*, Montevideo, 1927, page 52.

⁵The increase in electric facilities in the interior is illustrated by an increase in fixed capital from U\$3,211,000 on June 30, 1929, to U\$6,383,000 on June 30, 1932. Even more striking is the expansion in Montevideo. Fixed capital increased from U\$9,730,000 on June 30, 1929, to U\$16,434,000 on June 30, 1932. Of this increase U\$6,546,000 represents the construction and installation of a magnificent new central generating plant, appropriately named "José Battle y Ordóñez" in honor of the Uruguayan President who had done so much to encourage the development of state ownership.

ent the Usinas Electricas boasts that electricity is available practically everywhere in the republic. Two important private plants (Rivera and Melo) remain, whose concessions have expired but which the government is not yet ready to expropriate. There are two other insignificant private plants, and a municipal enterprise in Fray Bentos which is being operated by the state.

Another important step in the expansion of the Usinas Electricas has been its assumption of telephone service. The government, anticipating such action, for more than a decade had refused to give the two firms providing telephone service in the capital the guarantees necessary to make it worthwhile to modernize their plants. Consequently in the twenties and the early thirties the telephone system of Montevideo was considered to be one of the worst in the world. By the law of October 15, 1931, the Usinas Electricas was authorized to construct a new telephone system and to assume a country-wide monopoly as soon as it saw fit. In Montevideo an excellent modern system was installed and opened to public use in the fall of 1933. Rates are higher than those charged by the old companies but the excellence of service more than makes up for the difference. The number of customers is already over 20,000 as compared with 15,000 subscribers who had used the antiquated telephones. Not yet ready to take over the 12,000 telephones in the interior which are controlled by a number of small companies, the Usinas has adopted the policy of negotiating a selling price for each plant; once this is arranged the private owners undertake to keep the plant in repair until such time as the Usinas are ready to take it over at the previously arranged price.

PROFITS AND MANAGEMENT

A most unfortunate consequence of the depression was the appearance of political interference with the administration and the distribution of profits. In 1931-32 and 1932-33 extraordinary contributions were exacted from the Usinas Electricas to help defray the mounting budgetary deficits. The contributions of U\$400,000 compared with payments of U\$200,000 annually since 1922-23. After the coup d'etat of March 31, 1933 the government raised its share of the profits to 80%. The centralization of power in a strong executive reduced greatly the independence of the state industrial organizations. On August 21, 1933 President Terra insisted

that a law be passed requiring these organizations to effect a 20% reduction in their budgets;⁶ the law also gave the Executive power to revise downward (but not upward) the budgets of these enterprises and provided that the legislature was to decide any conflicts that might arise between the Executive and industrial enterprises. Salaries were lowered and an order issued that no post vacated was to be filled.⁷ Profit-sharing among employees was ended in 1932 in accordance with Terra's theory that any government which is daily accumulating an enormous deficit has no profits to share even though one of its branches may be making money.

CONCLUSIONS

The changes in policies of the Usinas Electricas during the depression are extremely significant. Currently in South America there is considerable agitation for state control of electric power and the Uruguayan experience is being emphasized as a great success. Yet in the first real test of the Usinas Electricas, in the first major political disturbance in a quarter of a century, the organization has found itself exposed to all the disadvantages commonly feared by opponents of state industry. There is danger lest a strong Executive use the Usinas as a milch cow. There is danger that the management's loss of freedom to use profits as it thinks best may reduce the incentive to accumulate large commercial balances, with a consequent decay of managerial efficiency. During the early years of the enterprise when it was gaining its reputation the management may have tended to be somewhat over-conservative. But the lack of conservatism is a

⁶In the effort to balance the national budget the Executive from the beginning insisted on large economies in the state's industrial domain. According to the Memoria del Ministerio de Hacienda, *Orientaciones Financieras del Gobierno del Uruguay desde el 31 de marzo de 1933*, Montevideo, 1934, pages 311-12, the budgets of nine autonomous entities (entes autonomos) approved for the year 1933-34 were slashed from U\$25,685,969 (total of budgets effective when the revolution took place) to U\$22,662,806. The reduction in the Usinas Electricas was from U\$5,415,148 to U\$5,087,631. In addition, however, the government counted on a saving of about U\$500,000 by the elimination of profit-sharing and another similar saving in the reduction of the wage bill. The wage reduction was 20%, with a 50% reduction in the case of difference between wages in the case of promotions.

⁷There was no wholesale removal of employees for political reasons following the coup d'etat. The management of the Usinas claims that only four men were removed out of 3500 employees.

much greater menace. In three years in the thirties the expansion in the interior was greater than in the preceding decade or more. In 1935 the Usinas Electricas entered the mining field to exploit deposits hitherto considered commercially unavailable. The purpose of this move was to produce commodities that might be bartered for fuel which is imported. An arrangement was completed in the summer of 1935 for the exchange of Uruguayan copper and lead for British coal to the value of £120,000. The willingness to enter into such business is evidence of the management's understanding of the emergency situation which calls for a minimizing of the demand for foreign exchange. But it undoubtedly is also evidence of a tendency away from conservative management. Again, the active support of the Rio Negro hydro-electric project, which would involve a tremendous investment (U\$45,000,000) and provide capacity far in excess of this generation's needs, contrasts sharply with the hesitancy with which the earlier management entered into the investment of much smaller sums for the supply of current in the interior.

The experience under the strain of economic depression and political uncertainty is too brief as yet to warrant generalizations. It may be that when the emergency has passed the management will revert to conservative practices and the government once more grant it the desired degree of autonomy. It is clear, however, that political stability coupled with the theory of "entes autonomos" which had developed in Uruguay contributed greatly to the success of this enterprise, and that the instability of governments in many countries that are considering the Usinas as a model to follow, and the well-nigh irresistible temptation to dip into the profits of industrial enterprises to cover other governmental expenditures, may doom these imitators to failure. It remains to be seen whether the increased participation of the government in the profits of the Usinas Electricas was the opening wedge to a general reorganization along political lines.

A CRISIS IN ITALIAN COLONIAL OPINION

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Recently my morning newspaper carried the headline that Mussolini had declared that Italy's security in Africa depended upon the elimination of the Ethiopian army. In saying this he reiterated the repeated claim of Italian colonialists that the warlike preparations and unfriendly attitude of Emperor Haile Selassie necessitated and justified military operations on the part of Italy.

This argument, connected as it is always with statements that colonies are necessary to the well-being of Italy, brings to mind the fact that at one time most Italians thought that Africa was composed of barren bits of sand, swamp, and mountain. This time was nearly forty years ago, when Italy's leaders very nearly decided to surrender all right and title to her footholds on the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. It is the object of this paper to describe the usually adverse opinion on the subject of colonies which prevailed in Italy after the battle of Adowa and to account for the failure of the Italian government to trust the convictions of the prime minister, the Marchese di Rudini, and the apparent ones of the public, which it did by remaining in Eritrea and Somaliland.

Lukewarmness towards colonial ventures was not to be wondered at after the Italian defeat at Adowa. In the 'eighties a few business men, travellers, and statesmen thought that Italy should not be left out of the great enterprise of the day—the civilizing of Africa. The British were willing that Italy should have a few footholds on the coast, which they feared might fall in the hands of France and Germany. The movement for colonies had never been widely popular, and had been tolerated because it had not required stupendous efforts on the part of the Italian people.

Francesco Crispi, however, paid no attention to this fact. He went so far as to envisage the creation of an Italian Africa extending from Tripoli across the Sudan to include present-day Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Italian Somaliland.¹ This bright dream, comparable in grandeur to the trans-African concepts

¹XXX, "Tripoli," *Nuova antologia*, Series IV, CXVII (1905), pp. 343-344.

of the British and French of that day, vanished in March 1896 as a consequence of the staggering Italian defeat at Adowa. The Abyssinian army was even more disorganized by victory than the Italian, and revenge was possible.² Few, however, advocated such a policy. As a consequence, the main problem which Italian statesmen had to solve was whether Italy would have any colonies at all; and, if so, what would be their extent.

As a matter of fact, apathy concerning the territory of Ethiopia was widespread. Interest was directed mainly towards the recovery of the prisoners who were in the hands of Menelik II, Emperor of Ethiopia.³ Even the colonialists heaped condemnation upon the government for having made war without knowing anything of colonization.⁴ The *Economista* of Florence summarized Italian feelings in 1897 when it said that no one doubted that Italy could scatter the Negus and his troops, but that the great majority of the Italians did not believe that it would be worth while.⁵

Such feelings were expressed plainly by the government when it brought hostilities to a formal end by signing the Treaty of Addis Abeba on October 26, 1896. By its terms Ethiopia was recognized to be a free and independent state. The Italian government pledged itself not to cede any of the occupied territory to any other power, and to surrender it to Ethiopia in case abandonment should be decided upon. Boundaries were left for later determination, although in the north the provisional one of the Mareb-Belesa-Muna was decided upon.⁶ The significance of these territorial clauses becomes clear when one considers that in June, 1897, the term "Ethiopian ports" is found being written into a commercial treaty between Italy and Ethiopia.⁷ In brief, during 1896 and 1897 the Italian government was willing to leave Africa to its fate.

At the present time, the principal wonder is why such a policy was not adopted and followed. The strength of the contemporary indictment against the value of colonies was

²Gennaro Mondaini, *Manuale di storia e legislazione coloniale del regno d'Italia*, part I (1927) pp. 124-128.

³*Nuova antologia*, Series IV, LXIV (1896), pp. 156-157.

⁴*Esplorazione commerciale*, XI (1896), p. 165.

⁵*Economista*, September 5, 1897.

⁶*Trattato di pace fra l'Italia e l'Etiopia* (1897).

⁷Mondaini, *op. cit.*, pp. 128-29.

very great. In addition, the Marchese di Rudini ached in every bone to get out of Africa,⁸ and his political career depended upon anti-African elements in parliament for support.⁹

The ground which the anti-Africanists covered in 1896 and 1897 was marked out for them in a book written by Doctor Napoleone Colajanni, and published in 1891. He pointed out that the first Italian attempts at African colonization had been undertaken without consultation of the people, and at a time when Italy was not prepared economically for such a task. But once the nation was confronted with a *fait accompli*, the Africanists claimed that the national honor was involved. Militarism, extravagance, bad administration, and injustice appeared, and necessary developments at home in the fields of agriculture, transportation, and education were neglected. Profits had gone into the hands of a few, thus strengthening an anti-democratic tendency. Development of the colonies had been prevented by the lack of water and the unsuitable climate. Eritrea, in his opinion, presented a fine example of "a colony of development in reverse."¹⁰

These general ideas were found repeatedly in the columns of the press, although single indictments of colonialism were never quite so sweeping. The *Nuova antologia* laid most emphasis on the evils of militarism and the expense of colonialism.¹¹ Vilfredo Pareto sympathized with the Italians who had been struck low by fevers from the swamps which could have been drained with the money thrown away in Africa. Italy's policy there had merely demonstrated the insipience of her generals and had served to swell the profits of her bankers, grain-dealers, and mule-merchants. In his opinion, Italy should offer Eritrea to Menelik in exchange for prisoners.¹² The *Messaggero* realized that the avoidance of a social war in Europe could be brought about by finding

⁸Bulow to Hohenlohe, November 3, 1896, *Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette* (1922ff), XI, pp. 261-262.

⁹Michele Rosi, *L'Italia odierna* (1927), II, part 3, p. 1974.

¹⁰Napoleone Colajanni, *Politica coloniale* (1891), pp. 1-134, *passim*; *ibid.*, pp. 317-319.

¹¹*Nuova antologia*, Series IV, LXIV (1896), pp. 156-157.

¹²*Il Giornale degli Economisti*, Series II, XII (1896), p. 104; *ibid.*, XIII (1896), p. 474; *ibid.*, XIV (1897), p. 175.

outlets in Africa, but it advised that Italy conserve her strength until this prospect should be more imminent.¹³

Other organs were just as practical in their advice as the *Messaggero*. *Il Secolo XIX* of Genoa argued that colonization always meant work and conquest, and that if the Italians were not willing to do either, Eritrea had better be abandoned. Besides, it would be shameful to sit down and become the gatekeeper of the castle (Ethiopia) which they had failed to take. On the other hand, the *Giornale di Sicilia* at Palermo ardently asserted that Massowa was worth no labor so long as the best outlets to Abyssinia were held by England and France.¹⁴

Naturally, the Socialists did not let the predicament of the Italian capitalistic government go unnoticed. The *Avanti* was sure that, sooner or later, Italy would be compelled to leave Africa and suggested that Menelik's drive towards the sea was natural and unstoppable. Eritrea had no economic future, and the money it might cost had better be spent at home.¹⁵

The anti-Africanists, however, were not without their opponents. One of the most influential of these was Edoardo Scarfoglio of the *Mattino* of Naples. He saw Africa as a continent of 100,000,000 people, which possessed boundless riches. Soon, it would be peopled, cultivated, and filled with teeming cities. Its development would create a new distribution of wealth and would enrich all the states which might be so fortunate as to possess a bit of it. To give away this prospect, in order to save four or five million lire, was nothing less than a suicidal fit born of a great moral depression and an obsession of renunciation.¹⁶

The *Tribuna* of Rome believed that the retention of a position upon the borders of Ethiopia would strengthen the rank of Italy in Europe. Almost prophetically—at least it seems so today—it said that such a position would lead to the replacement by Italy of France and Great Britain as the dominating influences in Abyssinia. At any rate, there was no reason to abandon the uplands of Eritrea. If the in-

¹³*Il Messaggero*, May 25, 1897.

¹⁴*Il Secolo XIX*, July 29, 1897; *Il Giornale di Sicilia*, March 12, 1897.

¹⁵*Avanti*, July 24, 1897.

¹⁶*Il Mattino*, May 23, 1897.

habitants were friendly, occupation would cost little; if not, a retreat to Massowa would not eliminate danger.¹⁷

Few, however, were willing to listen to these enthusiastic inhabitants of the colonialist world. But the more thought that was given to the matter by conservative and dignified elements of Italian thought, the more unseemly the idea of a "scuttle and run" policy appeared.

The scholarly point of view was presented by the President of the *Società Africana d'Italia*. He asked if errors committed in the conduct of colonial policy justified complete abandonment of the colonies which Italy had. Errors in the past had been due to action without proper preparation and information. He urged a scientific examination and requested support from all those who might be interested in the conversion of Africa to Catholicism, the abolition of slavery, and the rescue of that continent from barbarism.¹⁸

The *Preseveranza* of Milan, the mouthpiece of Rudini's foreign minister, the Marchese Visconti-Venosta, reflected a mood of sobre national dignity. It remarked that one does not leave a colony as one does a rented house without knowing just what persons might occupy it.¹⁹ The *Corriere della Sera* admitted that nobody wanted further military difficulties, but also said that the prospect of such difficulties would be the only thing which would keep the Italians from wanting to retain the uplands of Eritrea.²⁰ The *Economista* pointed out that complete abandonment was impossible after the record of blood and treasure of the last ten years. Eritrea should be limited to the confines of Massowa, or that which could be defended. Colonization on a large scale was beyond the resources of a poor country like Italy with uncultivated fields.²¹

An occupation limited to Massowa met the approval of Rudini's organ, the *Opinione*. It asserted that the uplands of Eritrea could not be peopled by Italians, and that its occupation would cost 15,000,000 to 20,000,000 lire per year. It announced that the government had decided to consolidate

¹⁷*La Tribuna*, March 9 and June 5, 1897.

¹⁸*Esplorazione commerciale*, XII (1897), pp. 303-304.

¹⁹*La Perseveranza*, May 23, 1897.

²⁰*Il Corriere della Sera*, March 22, 1897.

²¹*Economista*, XXVII (1896), pp. 770-771; *ibid.*, XXVIII (1897), pp. 321-322.

the Italian forces at Massowa and let the country definitely decide whether to hold, rent, or abandon.²²

These advocates of an occupation of Massowa alone probably contemplated eventual abandonment. At least, one advocate of the policy did. The *Lega Lombarda* envisaged the time when Italy could with dignity free herself from a protectorate over Eritrea, and hoped that the existing situation would be a lesson to those who had dragged the country into "this sad African adventure."²³

But despite these conservative longings for withdrawal, such a policy was not followed, and Rudini did not heed the promptings of his own heart. A careful examination of the circumstances reveals that the reasons for this failure were diplomatic and financial in character. An examination of them is in order.

Opposition to colonialism at the period which is being discussed grew mainly out of the fear that such a policy meant a continued drain of men and of money. This is, however, just what did not happen in the two years which followed the battle of Adowa. Rumors that the Ethiopians were advancing flew about frequently and it was predicted that Eritrea would always be a calvary of sorrows and blood.²⁴ But Menelik never resumed his march towards the sea, and it was found possible to reduce the Eritrean budget from almost 43,000,000 lire in 1896-1897 to 9,130,000 in 1898-1899.²⁵ Thus no crisis occurred, either on the Eritrean front or in the budget. Consequently, the opponents of colonialism lacked ammunition for their campaigns.

The major factor, however, in determining that Italy should retain Eritrea and Somaliland was the influence of the British. This can be illustrated by the Kassala episode.

Kassala is a frontier town in the Egyptian Sudan. The Italians occupied it in 1893 under an agreement made in 1891 that such an occupation would be provisional in character.²⁶ As soon as Rudini came into office in March, 1896, he thought of abandoning it; but the protests of Sir Clare

²²*L'opinione*, March 19 and September 19, 1897.

²³*La Lega Lombarda*, May 24, 1897.

²⁴Interview of A. Franzoi, *La Stampa*, January 6, 1898.

²⁵Modaini, *op. cit.*, p. 159.

²⁶Sir Edward Hertslet, *The Map of Africa by Treaty*, (1908), III, pp. 948-950.

Ford, British ambassador at Rome, caused him to change his mind.²⁷ A year later, he returned to his first decision, but he carefully stated that steps towards that end would be taken in agreement with England.²⁸ Lord Salisbury, British Foreign Secretary and Prime Minister, irritated him very much when he showed no haste in assuming the burden of Kassala's defense, but Rudini did not order its effective evacuation until he was sure that Anglo-Egyptian forces were ready to garrison it.²⁹

This care was due to the fact that England and Italy had been partners since the latter had gone into Africa, and to the continued recognition by Italian statesmen that a continuance and amplification of such a partnership was worth while. The Duke of Sermoneta argued, for example, that Kassala should be retained by Italian forces on account of the fact that England had manifested her friendship by sending Kitchener towards Dongola after the battle of Adowa.³⁰ The Marchese Visconti-Venosta insisted in July, 1897, that Kassala must not be evacuated so hastily as to bring about a termination of Italy's friendly relations with England.³¹

No one who has read the dispatches of H. Wickham Steed during 1897 to *The Times* (London) can doubt for a moment that Rudini was told by the British government that surrender of any part of Eritrea must be conditioned upon the consent of the British and Egyptian authorities.³² Rudini was therefore faced always with the practical ultimatum that a hasty surrender of colonial territory without paying heed to England's interests would cost him the diplomatic support of that power. Against such a contingency, the anti-African forces at home offered little.

In the case of Somaliland, the evidence of England's influence is clear and direct. In 1896 this colony consisted of a lease upon the ports of the Benadir and a vague protectorate to the North. In this year the *Societa anonima commerciale*

²⁷Caetani to Ferrero, April 10, 1896, *Documenti diplomatici*, no. 93 (1896), p. 46.

²⁸*Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati*, (1897), DLXX, p. 697.

²⁹Mario Grosso, "In tema di Cassala," *La Rassegna italiana*, XXVIII (1931), pp. 172-175.

³⁰*Atti parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati*, DLIII (1896), p. 3994.

³¹*Ibid.*, DLXXII (1897), p. 3345.

³²*The Times*, July 9, September 29, 30, October 4, 6, 25 and December 30, 1897.

del Benadir was organized in Milan and offered to operate the colony with the aid of a subvention from the state. The government hesitated between this and abandonment. But the Marchese Visconti-Venosta plainly told a legislative committee that the maintenance of cordial relations with England made it politically opportune that Italy should maintain her protectorate over this territory.³³

The conclusion that England's attitude swung the balance in favor of retention of colonial possessions is reinforced by the recollection that Italy in 1896 and in 1897 was in no position to be master of her fate in foreign policy. The nod of her old mentor was decisive. In view of the present situation at Lake Tana, this historical fact now seems ironical.³⁴

³³*Atti parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, DLXIX* (1896), document no. 215 A.

³⁴This article was made possible by a grant-in-aid from the Social Science Research Council of New York City.

RECENT CHANGES IN MISSOURI STATE GOVERNMENT

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As a native Missourian, I realize that the state is conservative in many respects. It has been slow in introducing changes in its administrative organization and methods. However, an analysis of recent legislation does show some important changes. Several piecemeal consolidations have been made; budgeting and accounting systems improved; centralized purchasing introduced; and a State Planning Board established. Also, the state government has assumed more authority and responsibility in local financial and welfare activities.

Piecemeal consolidations—Missouri furnishes an excellent example of administrative decentralization, having six popularly elected state officials and some sixty other offices, boards, bureaus, and commissions. Nevertheless, there have been a few important consolidations.

In 1921 the legislature abolished four independent penal and reform boards and placed those institutions under a penal commission of five members. It also abolished the separate boards of six eleemosynary institutions and established a bipartisan board of managers for eleemosynary institutions. It is composed of six members, two retiring every two years. Then in 1933 the legislature abolished the board of charities and corrections and the commission for the blind and conferred their principal duties upon the eleemosynary board. In 1935, the legislature added to the duties of this board, the administration of old age assistance. It is, in fact, a state board of public welfare, but with limited supervisory authority concerning county welfare activities.

The Missouri Association for Social Welfare sponsored a bill in the 1935 session of the General Assembly to change the name of the eleemosynary board to a board of public welfare and to give it extensive supervisory authority over local welfare matters. As originally drafted, this bill also would have abolished the penal commission and conferred its functions upon the welfare board. The bill died in committee. The

Association expects to sponsor a similar one in the next session, which will convene in January, 1937.

Strangely enough, few changes have been made in the educational field. Missouri has a separate board for each of seven state educational institutions. These are the University of Missouri, including the College of Agriculture and School of Mines and Metallurgy; Lincoln University for Negroes, and five state teachers colleges. Governor Guy B. Park recommended to the last General Assembly that six of these boards be abolished and their duties conferred upon the constitutional board of curators of the University. A bill to carry out his suggestion was drafted, introduced, and referred to a committee on educational institutions, where it died.

In 1933, the legislature substituted a commissioner of health, appointed and removable by the governor, for the secretary of the state board of health, appointed by the board, and also made him food and drug commissioner. The state board of health retains its licensing power and a few advisory and supervisory functions. Also in 1933, the state board of agriculture was abolished and its duties conferred upon a commissioner, appointed by the governor, to whom were added the duties of the marketing, plant, and dairy commissioner.

These piecemeal changes indicate a tendency to consolidate related departments and to substitute single commissioners for boards as department heads. Time alone will tell whether these tendencies will be continued. At present, there is no popular demand for wholesale reorganization. Incidentally, it would require a constitutional amendment to abolish the five elective officials, viz., secretary of state, auditor, treasurer, attorney general, and superintendent of public schools.

Budgeting—State budgeting in Missouri began in 1917, when the General Assembly made the newly established State Tax Commission a budgeting agency. Biennial budget reports were prepared by the Tax Commission from 1919 to 1933. Its budgeting powers were increased somewhat in 1927 and 1929. Until 1929 the budget report did not have to be submitted to the governor for his recommendation before it was presented to the legislature.

In 1921 the General Assembly passed an executive budget bill, but it was defeated by popular referendum in 1922. A constitutional amendment proposing an executive budget also met defeat in 1924. Similar measures failed to pass the

General Assembly in 1927 and 1929. Then in 1932 the voters adopted a constitutional amendment providing for an executive budget system.

The budget law of 1933, carrying out the provisions of the amendment, prescribes in considerable detail the budget procedure and contents of the report. The law did not provide for a new budget bureau, but made the chairman of the State Tax Commission ex-officio budget director to serve without additional salary. However, Governor Park appointed a state budget officer who is administering the law independently of the chairman and ex-officio director. Only \$17,000 was appropriated for the preparation and printing of the first biennial budget report, and \$18,840 for the next report.

The budget office prepared and the governor submitted to the legislature in 1935 a fairly comprehensive report, which showed some improvements over those formerly prepared by the State Tax Commission. And although the General Assembly paid scant attention to some of the recommendations, it is my opinion that at least a little progress has been made. Certainly, the budget law of 1933 furnishes a basis for development of effective budgeting.

Purchasing—The Associated Industries sponsored a bill in 1927 providing for centralized purchasing, and Governor Henry S. Caulfield supported a similar one in 1929, but both were defeated.

In 1933 the General Assembly provided for a state purchasing agent to be appointed by the governor with the consent of the senate. His maximum salary was fixed at \$5,000 per year. The agent is authorized to purchase all supplies except printing, binding, and paper for all state departments. He also negotiates all leases and purchases of land, except for agencies which have constitutional authority to buy real estate. In general, supplies must be purchased on the basis of competitive bids, to be based on standard specifications. Annual estimates of necessary supplies must be submitted by each agency to the agent, who is authorized to transfer supplies among departments, to sell surplus commodities, and to keep an inventory of movable supplies. He may permit the direct purchase by any agency of emergency and technical supplies. In 1933 an appropriation of \$15,000 was made for this office, and an additional one of \$20,000 was made in 1934 at a special session of the General Assembly.

Soon after the law became effective, the attorney general held, on constitutional grounds, that purchases of the courts, the General Assembly, and the University, and of road material by the highway commission were exempt. The purchasing agent accepted his opinion, and in addition ruled that all purchases of the highway commission were exempt.

The agent also has been generous in allowing purchases by the departments direct, after securing three or more competitive bids. And he has classified all items costing less than \$25.00 as emergency supplies, which may be purchased by a department direct without securing quotations.

Despite these apparently generous concessions, the agent is not one of the most popular state officials. Centralized purchasing is accused of being cumbersome, thereby causing unnecessary delay, and of being expensive and inefficient. Nevertheless, a bill to repeal the purchasing act made little progress in the 1935 session of the General Assembly, probably because it was opposed by Governor Park. Also, it is interesting and perhaps significant that the appropriation for this office for 1935-36 is \$115,000, or more than thrice that for 1933-34.

Accounting and Auditing—The budget law directs the state auditor and the budget director to prescribe a uniform system of accounting for all state departments, the accounts to be kept on an accrual basis. Another law, also enacted in 1933, requires the state auditor at least once every two years to audit the accounts of all state agencies and to formulate for them a simple system of uniform accounting and reporting.

Some progress has been made in carrying out the provisions of these laws, but much remains to be done. The present staff of the state auditor is too small to perform so large a task in such a brief time.

State Planning Board—The movement for state planning began in 1930 when the Missouri State Planning Association was organized with Judge Harry S. Truman, now U. S. Senator, as chairman. A Missouri State Planning Board was appointed by Governor Park on December 29, 1933, for the purpose of cooperating with the National Planning Board, the present National Resources Board. It was an extra-legal body composed of 14 outstanding citizens; a majority of them being lay members; a minority being public officials. Its of-

fice and research staff were financed as C. W. A. and F. E. R. A. projects.

The board attained legal recognition in 1935. It is now composed of 11 members, consisting of the six elective state officials, the game and fish commissioner, and four citizen members appointed by the governor. Its work is being financed as a W. P. A. project, the legislature having failed to appropriate funds for its use.

The State Planning Board is a new agency, an orphan in the state official family. Its consultants, Harland Bartholomew of St. Louis and S. Herbert Hare of Kansas City, and the research staff have hardly attained the full confidence and cooperation of the board, especially of the ex-officio members. Hence, its future is uncertain.

The original extra-legal board did secure the coordination of various state programs, such as the building of state highways to state parks. Also, the staff is now the official coordinating agency for the New Deal projects, a thankless job which has been performed with only meager success.

The staff is also interested in a survey of local governments in Missouri. This project is an excellent one which does not directly conflict with the interests of the ex-officio members. However, it does overlap more or less several other research projects which to date the coordinator has been unable to coordinate. Also, it presents numerous difficulties which only a person who has attempted to secure first-hand data in rural counties can appreciate.

The state board encouraged and assisted in the establishment of 30 unofficial county planning boards during the year 1935. In addition to personal interviews and field work, the state board prepared and furnished to county courts (i. e., Missouri county boards of commissioners) a model resolution for the establishment of a planning board. Also, a model set of rules and regulations was prepared and made available to the county planning boards.

The principal work of the county boards to date has been the preparation and recommendation of W. P. A. projects. While it is too early to pass judgment upon the effectiveness of this work, it is hoped that it may lead to the enactment of a county planning law.

Prior to 1935, Jackson and St. Louis counties were the only ones that had done any county planning, their work being

limited primarily to highways. There are two regional groups, interested in the Kansas City and St. Louis areas respectively. The Greater Kansas City Regional Plan Association is studying six counties, three in Missouri and three in Kansas. The St. Louis Regional Plan Commission is interested in an area surrounding St. Louis, having a radius of approximately 35 miles. About half of this territory is in Illinois and half in Missouri.

County-State Relations—Marked improvement has been made in county financial administration since 1933, when the General Assembly enacted laws requiring the preparation of county budgets, installation of uniform accounts, and periodic auditing of county offices and institutions. The state auditor and his staff have received the hearty co-operation of practically all county officials in the preparation of budgets and installation of uniform accounts. However, he has not been able to audit all county offices and institutions as provided by law, for lack of an adequate staff. Nor has he been able to devise a simple uniform financial statement showing the more important functional costs, due to the detailed provisions of other statutes.

The state in 1935 relieved the counties of two-thirds of the cost of caring for indigent insane persons in state institutions, appropriating \$2,400,000 for this purpose, and established a system of state old age assistance to be administered under the supervision of the eleemosynary board. The latter program has been slow in getting under way, due to the lack of factual data regarding eligible applicants.

The members of the General Assembly estimated that some 10,000 to 15,000 persons would be eligible for pensions, but more than 75,000 applied. The board employed some 45 so-called "checkers" to check and classify the applications. Consequently, the payment of pensions was delayed from September, 1935, when the law became effective, until January, 1936. On April 1, 1936, more than 11,000 were receiving assistance in amounts varying from \$7 to \$12 per month, or an average of about \$10 per month. At these rates, some 15,000 can be given assistance from the \$2,500,000 appropriation for the remainder of the biennium 1935-1936. If the state secures federal assistance under the Social Security Act, the number receiving aid can be doubled, or the amount per person increased.

However, a few provisions of the Missouri law will have to be changed by 1940 to conform with the Social Security Act. It will require an amendment to the state constitution to reduce the age limit from 70 years to 65 years, as provided in the federal law.

It was the intention of the legislature that one per cent sales tax should finance old age assistance and costs for the care of the insane, provide \$6,000,000 for direct relief, and approximately the same amount for the public schools. It was estimated that this tax would raise \$1,000,000 per month, or a total of \$18,000,000 by December 31, 1936, but it now appears that the total may not exceed \$16,000,000. One-third of this amount automatically goes to the public schools. Most of the \$6,000,000 for direct relief has already been expended. Unless additional revenue is secured, the state must retire from this field and leave direct relief to the counties. The remainder of the expected revenue from the sales tax is inadequate to pay the cost of its administration and to meet the appropriations for old age assistance and costs for the care of the insane.

A number of people, particularly in the city-county of St. Louis, have been demanding that the Governor call a special session of the General Assembly to raise additional revenue for relief. The Governor recently appeared willing to call a special session, provided he could be assured of friendly action by the legislature. In March he wrote to each of the 184 legislators, asking him if he would vote for additional taxes, and if so, for what kind of taxes. On April 4, the Governor announced that a majority of the replies were unfavorable, and that a special session would not be called. As this paper is being written, local units of government are again shouldering the direct relief burden.

Mr. Carter Atkins, director of the Government Research Institute in St. Louis, claims that the state has a reservoir of \$3,000,000 in unappropriated revenues and unspent balances which could be appropriated immediately for relief purposes. He says the legislature should meet only for the purpose of passing an appropriation bill, that additional taxes are not needed. The Governor and the State Auditor have challenged the accuracy of Mr. Atkins' figures. They say he has greatly over-estimated the probable income from the liquor and sales taxes.

EDITORIAL

The Southwestern Social Science Quarterly was first published in 1920 as the official expression of thought in political science in a new, vigorous, and rapidly developing region—the American Southwest. To the original founders, Professors H. Q. James and C. G. Haines, to Dr. C. B. Patterson, their successor, and to the University of Texas must be accorded the full credit for originating and developing an organ for the dissemination of objective and scientific information concerning government in the region. Whether the development into what is now the Southwestern Social Science organization and the Southwestern Social Science Quarterly is the same as the original projectors of the idea intended is insignificant. To the origination of an idea and of a plan for carrying on that idea in actual practice, more credit is due than normally is accorded. Once a movement or an organization is founded and has established a considerable reputation and good will, it is comparatively easy for others to carry forward the movement.

With this issue, there is effective a change in editorial management of the Southwestern Social Science Quarterly. We have prefaced our remarks concerning our aims for the Quarterly with this tribute to the former editors and to the University of Texas, because it has been under the guidance of these men and of the institution, which they represented, that the Journal and the Association came into being in the first place, and has been developed to the point where it includes all of the social sciences and has an association membership of several hundred and a Quarterly mailing list of over 400. It is not the aim of the new editor-in-chief to institute any far-reaching changes in the form and content of the Quarterly. Fortunately, the editors who have developed the Quarterly to the present high rating make it wholly unnecessary for any newcomer to feel obligated to effect any sweeping changes. The Southwestern Social Science Quarterly commands and has commanded a high place in social science circles throughout the country and wherever it is known. The new incumbent in editorial policies hopes that he can preserve for the Quarterly and for the Southwestern Social Science Association the prestige which has been established.

We are today living in a world so thoroughly confused by issues, cross-currents, and practical problems that many students of these problems have become pessimistic concerning the future of government and society. The challenge thrown down to the social sciences as a result of these myriad forces and problems is perhaps greater than at any time before in human history. Although our knowledge of the world and of science particularly has grown apace, our knowledge of the methods of control of accompanying problems has not kept pace with the increasing complexity and magnitude of these problems. Social scientists in the future are going to be called upon more than ever before to take a larger part in diagnosing the difficulties of governments and of social and economic problems of these governments. It is for these reasons that a coordinated regional social science association and official mouthpiece can be of inestimable value not only as a fact-finding organization, but as a fact-applying organization in the control of the problems falling within the scope of the social sciences.

The social sciences must hold together as a unit; the social sciences compose a unit. Fortunately no one of the several social sciences covers the whole scope of problems emanating from a world society. The scope of the problems of that society can be encompassed only through a coordination of effort on the part of all social scientists. The work of any one social science specialist at best is but one piece of the entire framework of the whole structure. All of the social sciences working together in coordinated activity, however, can furnish the machinery for the complete study of the multiple organizations of human society and the practical problems emanating therefrom.

The developing Southwest with its rapid increase in population, its fast growing cities, and the accompanying problems of government make the function of a regional organization such as the Southwestern Social Science Association and a regional quarterly such as the Southwestern Social Science Quarterly of more significance to the area of which it is a part than ever before. Social scientists of the future, especially southwestern social scientists, will not be a group of cloistered individuals, sitting apart and unconcerned with the problems of the world. Rather they will be in the midst of these problems, seeking in an advisory capacity to help in their control.

We, therefore, in our first editorial comment urge especially that the social scientists, composing the membership of the Southwestern Social Science Association, continue to regard the Association and the Quarterly as a great cooperative venture, which purposes to effect far-reaching results that will redound to the improvement of the practical problems falling within the scope of the social sciences. In so doing, the social scientists will have preserved a policy which will achieve not only best results for the great society, but also for each of them individually.

J. J. R.

NOTES FROM THE SOUTHWEST

Under this heading, the editors of the Quarterly hope to begin a feature which will be not only of human interest to the social scientists of the Southwest, to the departments and institutions which they represent, but which will serve also to stimulate a greater degree of solidarity and interest in prosecuting the aims of the social sciences in the Southwest. It is hoped that every reader of the quarterly will take an active interest in news concerning any departmental changes effected in the social sciences in his institution. The addition of personnel, special research and research awards that may be made, and the publication of the results of research are especially desired.

There is a fundamental difficulty in publishing a journal which covers the entire field of the social sciences. The articles published necessarily cover a wide range of subjects and interests. It is hoped that occasionally the editors may be able to devote an issue to some central theme. If contributions could then be made on the general subject by persons in the several specialisms, some of the difficulty connected with uncoordinated articles could be eliminated. For these reasons, the editors would welcome suggestions from the readers of the Quarterly as to subjects for special issues. The editors would also welcome suggestions as to ways and means of improving the Quarterly.

If this section can serve as a clearing house of information on matters pertaining to the Southwest; if it can serve as a sort of open forum where ideas can be expressed or exchanged, the results secured should help toward a greater integration of the social sciences in the Southwest. We hope, therefore, through this column to be able to bring the social scientists in the Southwest closer together. We have to depend on cooperation of each member if we are to realize to the fullest extent our aims of making this feature of the Quarterly what it should be.

**SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE SOUTHWESTERN
SOCIAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION**

The seventeenth annual meeting of the Southwestern Social Science Association was held in the Hotel Texas, Fort Worth, Texas, April 9, 10, and 11, 1936. The Secretary-Treasurer disclaims all responsibility for the program as given below since some of the program chairmen have neglected to provide a corrected program. The program, corrected as far as possible, was as follows:

THURSDAY, APRIL 9, 6:15 P. M.

Conference and Dinner of Officers and Editors Japanese Room

FRIDAY, APRIL 10, 9:00 A. M.

Accounting Section Room 327

Chairman: W. D. Rich, Hardin-Simmons University.

Development and Activities of the Office of State Auditor, C. B. Sheffield, State Auditor of Texas.

Some Inconsistencies Between the Corporation Laws of Southwestern States and Established Principles of Accounting and Finance, B. F. Condray, Jr., Texas Technological College.

Possible Effects of the Social Security Act on Corporate Payroll Accounting, Charles Rovetta, University of Colorado.

Discussion: Clifton Morris, Vice-President, Texas Society of Certified Public Accountants, Fort Worth.

The Federal Income Tax as an Influence on Business Policy, Chester F. Lay, University of Texas.

Discussion: Lawrence H. Fleck, Southern Methodist University.

FRIDAY, APRIL 10, 9:00 A. M.

**Business Administration and Economics Sections
(Joint Session) Cactus Room**

Chairman: A. T. Flint, Oklahoma College for Women.

The Meaning of Inflation, Dean William F. Hauhart, Southern Methodist University.

Discussion: M. L. Williams, Southwestern University; O. E. Baker, Hardin-Simmons University.

Practical Difficulties in the Way of Hedging Against Price Inflation, James C. Dolley, University of Texas.

Discussion: E. R. McCartney, Fort Hays Kansas State College; Fred G. Watts, Oklahoma Baptist University.

FRIDAY, APRIL 10, 9:00 A. M.

Government Section Longhorn Room 1

Chairman: Hugo Wall, University of Wichita.

The Kansas Experience With a Legislative Council, F. H. Guild, University of Kansas, Director of Research Department, Kansas Legislative Council.

Discussion: S. C. E. Powers, Henderson State Teachers College, Arkansas.
State Government in Arkansas, Spencer D. Albright, University of Arkansas.
Recent Changes in Missouri State Government, William L. Bradshaw, University of Missouri.
State Government Reform in Texas, J. Alton Burdine, University of Texas.
College Work in Police Training, E. J. Hansen, Personnel Officer of the Wichita, Kansas, Police Department.

FRIDAY, APRIL 10, 9:00 A. M.**History Section**

Room 363

Chairman: Max L. Shipley, Texas State College for Women.
Protestant Missionary Activities in Mexico, 1860-1935, W. J. Hammond, Texas Christian University.
Changed Attitudes of the Hispanic-American Countries With Reference to the Monroe Doctrine, T. H. Reynolds, Oklahoma A. and M. College.
Soviet Economics, Dorsey D. Jones, University of Arkansas.
A Crisis in Italian Colonial Opinion, J. L. Gianville, Southern Methodist University.

FRIDAY, APRIL 10, 9:00 A. M.**Human Geography Section**

Room 325

Chairman: Sam T. Bratton, University of Missouri.
Investigations in the Teaching of Geography in the Elementary and Secondary Schools of Northeastern Oklahoma, Nason N. Duncan, Vinita, Oklahoma.
The Evolution of the Sugar Industry in the Irish Bend District, Louisiana, Elizabeth Troth, Stephen J. Hay School, Dallas, Texas.
Phases of Land Utilization in the Cherokee Indian Country of Oklahoma, Leslie Hewes, University of Oklahoma.
The Relations of Race and Geography to Civilization, J. E. Pearce, University of Texas.

FRIDAY, APRIL 10, 9:00 A. M.**Sociology Section**

Rathskeller

Chairman: L. L. Bernard, Washington University.
The Southwestern Social Science Survey, F. A. Buechel, University of Texas.
Activities of the Texas Planning Board, E. A. Wood, Director of the Texas Planning Board.
The Texas Sociological Survey, W. P. Meroney, Baylor University.
Population Changes in the Small Towns of Kansas, Carroll D. Clark, University of Kansas.

FRIDAY, APRIL 10, 12:15 P. M.

Accounting, Agricultural Economics, Business Administration, Economics, Government, and Sociology
Joint Luncheon Conference

Longhorn Rooms

Presiding Officer: Arthur B. Adams, President of the Association.

Address: *Problem of the Unemployed*, Dr. Coady of Antigonish Parish, Nova Scotia.

FRIDAY, APRIL 10, 12:15 P. M.

History Luncheon Conference

Cactus Room

Presiding Officer: George R. Poage, Texas State College for Women.
An East Tennessee Family During Civil War and Reconstruction, J. L. Kingsbury, North Texas State Teachers College.

FRIDAY, APRIL 10, 12:15 P. M.

Human Geography Luncheon Conference

Japanese Room

Presiding Officer: Sam T. Bratton, University of Missouri.
Geography in the State Teachers Colleges of Texas, Harriett Smith, Sam Houston State Teachers College.

FRIDAY, APRIL 10, 2:00 P. M.

Accounting, Business Administration, Economics, and

Government Sections (Joint Session)

Longhorn Room 3

Chairman: Hugo Wall, University of Wichita.

General Theme: *Economic Security*.

Accounting: *Unemployment Insurance and Business Policy*, Elmore Peterson, University of Colorado.

Business Administration: James C. Dolley, University of Texas.

Economics: John B. Ewing, University of Oklahoma.

Government: Emmette S. Redford, University of Texas.

Discussion: Frank K. Rader, Southern Methodist University; Alpheus Marshall, Texas Christian University.

FRIDAY, APRIL 10, 2:00 P. M.

History Section

Room 363

Chairman: C. A. Bridges, North Texas State Teachers College.

S. H. Newman, Editor of "The Lone Star" of El Paso, Texas, J. L. Waller, Texas College of Mines and Metallurgy.

Early Advancement Among the Five Civilized Tribes, Edward Davis, East Central State Teachers College.

Responsibility for the Final Destruction of the Old "Merrimac", H. A. Trexler, Southern Methodist University.

Confederate Ordnance, 1861-1862, Emmett M. Landers, Hardin-Simmons University.

FRIDAY, APRIL 10, 2:00 P. M.

Human Geography Section

Rathskeller

Chairman: Edw. J. Foscue, Southern Methodist University.

New Type of Climograph, C. J. Bollinger, University of Oklahoma.

Geography Misses a Golden Opportunity, Leland S. Paine, Texas A. and M. College.

Russia (Illustrated), Victor H. Schoffelmayer, Agricultural Editor, The Dallas News.

FRIDAY, APRIL 10, 2:00 P. M.

Sociology Section

Room 325

Chairman: Walter T. Watson, Southern Methodist University.

Tourist Camps of Dallas, Texas, Elbert L. Hooker, Southern Methodist University.

Some Problems of Public Welfare Administration, Mrs. Mattie Cal Gibson Maxted, University of Oklahoma.

Some Sociological Aspects of Relief, Mrs. M. L. Wooten, Texas State College for Women.

Discussion, Elmer Scott, Dallas Civic Federation.

Business Meeting, Chairman, O. D. Duncan, Oklahoma Agricultural and Mechanical College.

FRIDAY, APRIL 10, 6:45 P. M.

General Conference Dinner

Ball Room

Presiding Officer: Floyd L. Vaughan, Chairman of Program Committee.

Presidential Address: Arthur B. Adams.

Address: *Deserts on the March*, Paul B. Sears, University of Oklahoma.

SATURDAY, APRIL 11, 8:00 A. M.

Accounting Section Breakfast Meeting

Chairman: Chester F. Lay, University of Texas.

SATURDAY, APRIL 11, 9:00 A. M.

Accounting Section

Room 327

Chairman: A. L. Boeck, Texas Christian University.

Round Table: *Conditions and Problems of Accounting Education and Practice in Southwestern States.*

Colorado: Charles Rovetta, University of Colorado.

Louisiana: Daniel Borth, Louisiana State University.

New Mexico: T. E. Morris, College of Mines, El Paso.

Oklahoma: G. B. McCowen, Oklahoma A. and M. College.

Texas: W. D. Rich, Hardin-Simmons University.

SATURDAY, APRIL 11, 9:00 A. M.

**Agricultural Economics and Economics Sections
(Joint Session)**

Cactus Room

Chairman: Frank Briggs, Editor, Farm and Ranch.

Agricultural-Industrial Relationships in a Coordinated Adjustment Program, A. S. Lang, Baylor University.

Discussion: W. T. Wilson, University of Arkansas.

SATURDAY, APRIL 11, 9:00 A. M.**Business Administration Section**

Longhorn Room 3

Chairman: Wm. F. Hauhart, Southern Methodist University.

Development of Retail Sales and Credit Indexes, Edward L. Lloyd, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce.

Discussion: Findley Weaver, University of Oklahoma.

Topic: *Correlation of Course Content in the Business Administration Curriculum.**Marketing*: F. K. Hardy, University of Texas.*Finance*: I. J. Sollenberger, University of Oklahoma.

Discussion: Karl D. Reyer, University of Oklahoma, Marketing.

James B. Trant, Louisiana State University.

William F. Hauhart, Southern Methodist University.

SATURDAY, APRIL 11, 9:00 A. M.**Government Section**

Longhorn Room 1

Chairman: Claude V. Hall, East Texas State Teachers College.

Judicial Treatment of the New Deal, Bruce R. Trimble, University of Kansas City.

Discussion: J. H. Leek, University of Oklahoma.

Some Aspects of Oklahoma Politics, R. J. Dangerfield, University of Oklahoma.

Discussion: Sam B. McAllister, North Texas State Teachers College.

Political Sectionalism in Missouri and Kansas, Edwin O. Steen, University of Kansas.

Discussion: O. Douglas Weeks, University of Texas.

Ethiopian Crisis, L. H. Halden, University of Houston.

Discussion: S. D. Myers, Jr., Southern Methodist University.

SATURDAY, APRIL 11, 9:00 A. M.**History Section**

Room 363

Chairman: R. N. Richardson, Hardin-Simmons University.

The Decline of the French Provincial Nobility in the Eighteenth Century, John Preston Moore, University of Arkansas.*The Study and Writing of French History in American Colleges and Universities*, E. M. Violette, Louisiana State University.*Significant Trends in American Historiography*, Ralph H. Records, University of Oklahoma.*British Loans to Mexico, 1823-1846*, C. A. True, Texas Christian University.**SATURDAY, APRIL 11, 9:00 A. M.****Human Geography Section**

Room 325

Chairman: C. J. Bollinger, University of Oklahoma.

Some Problems of Land Resettlement in Texas, M. F. Burrill, Oklahoma A. and M. College, Stillwater.*Environmental Influences on Early Babylonian Architecture*, Sidney E. Ekblaw, University of Kansas City, Kansas City, Missouri.

Transportation Adjustments to Topography in Dallas, Edw. J. Foscue, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas.

SATURDAY, APRIL 11, 9:00 A. M.

Sociology Section

Japanese Room

Chairman: C. P. Blackwell, Oklahoma Agricultural and Mechanical College.
Land Planning and Social Development in Arkansas, Orville J. Hall, University of Arkansas.

A Survey of the Rehabilitation Clients in Arkansas, William H. Metzler, University of Arkansas.

Social Population and Social Problems: Oklahoma, J. J. Rhyne, University of Oklahoma.

The Sociologists Viewpoint on Teacher Training, J. L. Dufolt, West Texas State Teachers College.

SATURDAY, APRIL 11, 12:15 P. M.

Business Luncheon

Longhorn Rooms

Chairman: Arthur B. Adams, University of Oklahoma.

SATURDAY NOON

The seventeenth annual business luncheon and meeting was attended by about seventy members. President Arthur B. Adams presided at the session until the new president was elected. The usual order of business was followed, to-wit: Minutes of the Sixteenth Annual Business Meeting were read and were approved as read. Professor Floyd L. Vaughan, Chairman of the Committee on Membership, reported on membership of the Association, which was followed by the Secretary-Treasurer's report on finances. Those reports were as follows:

REPORT ON MEMBERSHIP

(Note: By action of the Sixteenth Annual Convention the Secretary-Treasurer was authorized to drop those who have been carried on his books for longer than one-quarter in arrears and to elevate delinquent members to good standing if they pay the subscription for the past year due and one year in advance.)

—I—

	April, 1932	April, 1933	April, 1934	April, 1935
Life -----	1	1	1	1
Contributing -----	3	3	3	3
Sustaining -----	2	2	2	2
Active -----	333	323	334	324
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
	339	329	340	330

—II—

	April, 1935	April, 1936
Life	1	1
Contributing	3	5
Sustaining	2	2
Active:		
1. Individuals (in good standing)	106	191
2. Individuals (in arrears)	96	36
3. Libraries (in good standing)	122	114
4. Libraries (in arrears)	---	10
	<hr/> 330	<hr/> 359

—III—

Individuals dropped since April 1, 1935	17
Libraries dropped since April 1, 1935	2
	<hr/> 19

FINANCIAL STATEMENT FOR THE SIXTEENTH FISCAL PERIOD

(Note: By action of the Fifteenth Annual Convention the Secretary-Treasurer was ordered to close his books as of January 31st.)

RECEIPTS:

Balance, Jan. 31, 1935	\$ 231.95
Memberships	1,060.55
Reprints	54.20
Sale of Publications	28.25
Research Publications Fund	295.20
Miscellaneous (refunds, fees, etc.)	31.60

DISBURSEMENTS:

Printing, University Press	\$ 873.26
Printing, Tardy Press (and mailing)	208.27
Post-Office Deposits	10.00
Stamps and Supplies	91.30
Convention Expenses (last year)	116.00
Clerical Help and Proof Reading	39.30
Bank Charges, etc.	5.04
Miscellaneous (hauling, etc.)	32.00
Balance on Hand, January 31, 1936	326.38
	<hr/>
	\$1,701.75 \$1,701.75

FINANCIAL STATEMENT
(Supplement)

Financial Condition of the Association as of April 6, 1936.

Outstanding Obligations:

Printing (Tardy Press)	
March, 1936, Quarterly	\$ 267.77

Stenographic Bureau (Stamps and supplies since Jan. 15, 1936) -----	24.92
	<hr/>
	\$ 292.69
Cash on Hand -----	381.98
	<hr/>
Remainder -----	\$ 89.29

Quarterly Printing Costs:

March, 1935 -----	500 copies, 118 pp. @ \$2.40-----	\$ 283.20
June, 1935 -----	500 copies, 114 pp. @ \$2.40-----	273.60
September, 1935 -----	500 copies, 87 pp. @ \$2.00-----	208.27
December, 1935 -----	440 copies, 90 pp. @ \$2.00-----	197.38
		<hr/>
		\$ 962.45

(The cost stated for the September and December issues of the *Quarterly* include mailing charges. The number of copies of the December issue is approximate.)

REPORT OF THE AUDITING COMMITTEE

The undersigned, appointed to audit the financial records of the Association, have conferred with the two Treasurers who served during the last fiscal year, ending January 31, 1936, and find that the records available are insufficient to enable an audit to be made. Our services, of course, remain at the command of the Association.

(Signed)

A. S. LANG
FINDLEY WEAVER
CHESTER F. LAY

REPORT OF THE BOARD OF EDITORS

Stuart A. MacCorkle, Secretary-Treasurer, reporting for Caleb Perry Patterson, Editor-in-Chief, analyzes the contents of volume XVI of the *Quarterly*, giving the cost per issue, the size in pages, the distribution of articles by authorship and subject matter. He also commented upon editorial policy and problems.

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION

For the Committee on the Constitution, Professor O. D. Duncan read the Constitution as drawn and proposed by the Committee. After so reading, he moved its adoption and called for a discussion. Finally, after much discussion, Dean James B. Trant moved that the proposed Constitution be provisional for one year, that at the next annual business meeting it be again discussed and resubmitted, that a vote be taken regarding its final adoption. This motion was seconded and carried.

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON NOMINATIONS

The Committee on Nominations, composed of W. D. Rich, Chairman; Floyd L. Vaughan, and John Rydjord, proposed the following officers for the Association for the coming year: President, Rupert N. Richardson, Hardin-Simmons University, Abilene, Texas; First Vice-President, James B. Trant, Dean of the College of Business Administration, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana; Second Vice-President, Hugo Wall, University of Wichita, Wichita, Kansas. The report was accepted by those present, and President Adams declared the foregoing nominees duly elected.

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON RESOLUTIONS

The Committee on Resolutions, composed of O. D. Duncan, Chairman; J. Alton Burdine, and H. W. Blalock, reported as follows:

Your Committee on Resolutions submits for your consideration and adoption the following resolutions:

That the Association express its gratitude and appreciation to Dr. Coady of Antigonish Parish, Nova Scotia, for his interesting and instructive lecture at the noonday luncheon on April 10.

That the Association express its deep appreciation to Dr. Paul B. Sears for his lecture at the General Banquet Friday evening, April 10.

That this Association express its appreciation to the officers of the Association and the Section Chairmen for their efforts toward making these programs possible.

That this Association express its appreciation to the management and employees of the Texas Hotel who have not spared effort to administer to our needs in these meetings in every detail.

SPECIAL RESOLUTION

The Sociology Section of the Association adopted the following recommendation to be transmitted to this body as a resolution:

It is recommended that hereafter each section of the Southwestern Social Science Association be granted entire autonomy in constructing insofar as this is compatible with the task of coordinating the various elements of the program by the Central Committee and that whenever it may become necessary on the part of the Central Committee or other officials to modify the program in any way affecting its personnel, approval of the Section Chairman shall be obtained either by writing or by wire and that without confirmation of the Section Chairman no alterations shall be made.

Professor Chester F. Lay moved:

That, first, the Secretary be instructed to inscribe in the records of the Association, the special recognition and appreciation by the members present at the annual business meeting, of the extraordinarily successful service of the retiring President which has been rendered with courage and personal sacrifice.

That, second, the Secretary be instructed to transmit to Dean Adams this expression of our confidence in his complete sincerity of purpose in endeavoring to promote the best interests of the Association.

The above resolutions were approved by the Association.

MISCELLANEOUS BUSINESS

Since the new Constitution provided that the various Section Chairmen be members of the Executive Council, President Richardson introduced them and asked that they meet with that body after the Business Meeting had adjourned.

Professor Floyd L. Vaughan moved that since Professor Chester F. Lay had been called upon to prepare the Accounting program only three weeks before the Annual Meeting of the Association, he had of necessity contracted an unusual expense of thirty-five dollars in so doing, and that the Secretary-Treasurer be authorized to pay to Professor Lay one-half of this amount. Although Professor Lay protested, the motion was seconded and carried.

Professor J. Lloyd Mecham moved that preliminary programs be mailed out at least four weeks before the Annual Meeting of the Association. This motion was seconded but failed to carry.

There being no further business, President R. N. Richardson declared the Seventeenth Annual Business Meeting of the Southwestern Social Science Association adjourned.

After the Business Meeting had adjourned, the Executive Council met to consider matters concerning the policy of the Association. Dr. Stuart A. MacCorkle was reelected Secretary-Treasurer to serve the coming year. He was given permission to employ assistance to keep all books and records of the Association. Dr. J. J. Rhyne, by vote of the Council, was selected as Editor-in-Chief of the *Quarterly*. The following were selected by their respective sections to serve on the Program Committee for the ensuing year:

Accounting:

Chester F. Lay, Professor of Accounting, University of Texas.

Business Administration:

J. C. Dolley, Professor of Money and Banking, University of Texas.

Government:

Wm. L. Bradshaw, Professor of Government, University of Missouri.

History:

Tom H. Reynolds, Professor of History, Oklahoma A. and M.

Human Geography:

W. T. Chambers, State Teachers College, Nacogdoches, Texas.

Sociology:

Walter Watson, Professor, Southern Methodist University.

Economics:

Karl E. Ashburn, Southern Methodist University.

In accordance with the provisions of the new Constitution, as indicated above, the members of the Program Committee are also to serve as members of the Executive Council. By ruling of the Council, it was decided that they, in addition, were to act as associate editors of the *Quarterly* and to serve as the Committee on Membership.

President Richardson, with the consent of the Executive Council, named Professor W. D. Rich of Hardin-Simmons University General Program Chairman for next year. The Council voted that the next Annual Meeting of the Association be held in Dallas, Texas.

Stuart A. MacCorkle,
Secretary-Treasurer.

BOOK REVIEWS

EDITED BY O. DOUGLAS WEEKS
The University of Texas

Adams, James Truslow, *The Living Jefferson*, (New York and London: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936, pp. vii, 403.)

Another first-rate volume has just fallen from the pen of James Truslow Adams. This book, *The Living Jefferson*, glorifies Jefferson as being the greatest Liberal that America has produced and the most intensely "American" of the figures of his time. Mr. Adams here portrays American history as the story of a chronic conflict between two schools of political thought. The one school holding to the theory that political power belongs to the people and that they are capable of governing themselves—the other that they are not to be trusted and that they should be ruled "by the wise, the rich, and the good." Mr. Adams seems to enlist in Jefferson's camp on the side of democracy. However, it should be remembered that while believing in democracy, Jefferson made it clear that he did not believe in government merely by the mob.

The schism between the two schools of political thought appeared early. This divergence came much before Jefferson's time. As the author points out, the founders of the Massachusetts Bay Colony operated "quite in the fashion of a modern authoritarian State" to abridge popular liberties. The free loving spirits moved out and sought their independence upon the frontiers. As our history demonstrates, those who held to democratic doctrines went West, building frontier after frontier until the frontier closed. They left the Atlantic seaboard to be governed by "the wise, the rich, and the good."

Jefferson was born, matured and developed his political theories in Virginia. At this time Virginia was a plantation society with undeveloped communication. It was easy for him to conceive of a society in which landed property would be much more equally distributed among the people generally, who would thus feel the satisfaction and responsibility of ownership, and who, because their properties were small, would farm them more carefully. Jefferson became the leader of this group—the small farm element and those who turned West.

Liberalism and the love of liberty were not phases of Jefferson's youth as the author of this volume so frequently demonstrates. He did not, like Patrick Henry and Samuel Adams, later become conservative. Being a devotee of liberty he insisted upon certain general rights which in his view could alone make life worth living for civilized man—"such as the rights of freedom of speech, press, thought, religion, and the life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness of the Declaration of Independence." The Declaration, Jefferson said, he intended to be "an expression of the American mind", and in Mr. Adams's opinion, it is just that—an expression of the Frontiersman's mind. Jefferson could not and did not class the right to acquire and possess property along with such natural rights as "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." His primary concern with the art of or theory of government was its effect on the daily life and happiness of the indi-

viduals governed, as individuals. He was concerned with fitting a government to the people, while Hamilton desired to fit the people to a preconceived form of government.

All the evidence throughout Jefferson's life points clearly to the fact that he possessed a genuine lack of desire for public office; his preference was for a quiet life in his own home. However, he answered the call to duty again and again, never shirking his public obligations. As Mr. Adams points out, Jefferson was not a first-class executive, the governorship, the secretaryship of state, the vice-presidency, and the presidency were distasteful to him. No doubt much of his unhappiness in office came from the impossibility of expressing his idealism in executive action. Many of the best things he did while in office were at odds with his theory. His liberalism, it often appears, was an attitude of mind rather than a workable program.

The issues for which Jefferson fought are not yet settled. One of them especially has become most burning—the question of whether the people can govern themselves or must be governed. So, toward the end of his book Mr. Adams traces the recurring efforts of Jeffersonian liberalism to reinstate itself. The success has not been startling. America is no longer an agrarian society but has become urban and industrialized, with the result that the Jeffersonian formula has become increasingly difficult of application. In his concluding chapter Mr. Adams scores President Roosevelt for his failure to fulfill his pre-election promises and states that while the President has not become a dictator, he has brought our country dangerously near to the totalitarian state.

This volume gives the main facts of Jefferson's life; it portrays his political ideas and theories showing how they conflicted with those held by some of the leading men of his day—a conflict that makes Thomas Jefferson a living figure today.

STUART A. MACCORKLE

The University of Texas

Huus, Randolph O., *Financing Municipal Recreation*. (Menasha, Wisconsin: The George Banta Publishing Company, 1935, pp. xxiii, 249.)

The late entrance of recreation into the fold of municipal services has prevented that function from getting the attention which has been given to the older, traditional municipal departments. Students of municipal administration will welcome, therefore, this study of the financial aspects of municipal recreation for its service in clarifying many of the troublesome problems common to the operation of a recreation department. According to the author the purpose of this book is "primarily a consideration of problems of financial administration of the active phases of municipal recreation, as carried on by city governments in the United States". (p.xxii). In the pursuit of this objective the writer has concerned himself only with the most active forms of recreation and has not considered park services except in those instances when they are related directly to active recreation.

The study is divided into two parts, the first of which is concerned with the financing of municipal recreation and the second with recreation expenditures and budgets. In Part One possible income sources for the

financing of municipal recreation are considered in chapters treating of income from general taxation, special assessments, income from park and recreation properties, and gifts, transfers, leases, and permits. In Part Two the author enters into a detailed study of expenditures for municipal recreation, the preparation of the annual recreation budget, and financial planning of recreation expenditures.

Some of the more significant conclusions reached by the author are: (1) active recreation should depend primarily on appropriations from a general tax levy and not on special tax levies for revenues; (2) special assessments as a means of financing the acquisition of play-grounds should be carefully considered in those instances where general tax funds are not available; (3) excess condemnation as a means of financing expenditures for play-grounds has few things to recommend it; (4) many elements of an active recreation program can be financed from fees and charges secured through operation of the recreation facilities; (5) recreation budgets are generally inadequate and show few evidences of sound budgetary procedure; and (6) long-term planning for recreation has been largely ignored in most American cities.

While the author has been careful to keep his comments within the scope of the title, it is to be regretted, perhaps, that some consideration was not given to the administrative organization of the recreation department in American cities and its relation to the park department. Of primary importance is the independent board which has been used in many cities to administer the recreation department thus causing a dispersal of administrative responsibility. In addition, there is the matter of the effect of the depression on recreation revenues and expenditures. Most of the material contained in this book relates to years preceding 1932 when the depression had not yet made its full influence felt and consequently no information is available relating to the relative reduction in recreation revenues and expenditures as compared with other municipal activities.

These matters, however, are not vital criticisms since the original purpose of the author is realized in a competent manner. Especially noteworthy are the recommendations concerning the proper procedure in recreation budget-making. Care has been shown throughout to cite the various authorities consulted, and, in addition, a selected bibliography for each chapter has been placed at the end of the book. All in all, this study constitutes a worthy addition to those books concerned with particular phases of municipal administration.

R. WELDON COOPER

The University of Texas

Millspough, A. C., *Public Welfare Organization*. (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1935, pp. xxv, 700).

Acceptance of social responsibility for the care and welfare of those unfitted by one cause or another for normal competition and self-reliance has been a matter of slow but steady growth in the United States over a long period. The depression, however, has suddenly and enormously increased the responsibility of government in this regard, and it is no matter for surprise that such rapid expansion as has occurred should have strained

the facilities theretofore in existence. Since our emergency agencies have in some instances worked badly, and since we must apparently reconcile ourselves to a permanent enlargement of the scope of such activities, it is logical that we should turn our attention to questions of organization and administration.

Dr. Millspaugh's work, as his title suggests, does not concern itself with matters of policy. He is not engaging in propaganda for the extension of welfare activities; rather his concern is with how such activities should be carried on than with what the activities should be,—or perhaps even more narrowly, how the agencies should be arranged and organized to carry on such functions. The book is emphatically an inductive piece of work; perhaps excessively so. Dr. Millspaugh goes almost microscopically into the organization of each state agency for the promotion of each individual activity. The result, it must be admitted, is rather heavy going in some places, from the standpoint of pleasurable reading. It approximates at times a catalogue or handbook of governmental agencies and activities, but of course such a compilation is of great importance and value both to the professional social welfare worker and the student of government.

The work is not limited to a narrow study of welfare organizations as such, though they do, of course, constitute the main subject matter. The author also considers the whole problem of government and the relationship of this specific problem to it. There are some interesting and valuable pages devoted to the incredible and needless complexity of local government in the United States. Nor can Dr. Millspaugh be charged with ignoring the political problem involved in any administrative reorganization, as is so often the case with the cloistered student of administration. He is perfectly aware of such problems as patronage and the inertia of vested interests, and he takes them into account with the calm detachment of a scientific observer rather than indulging in the moral diatribes of a reformer.

The amount of research involved in this book, both as to original source material and as to secondary work, is simply staggering. Certainly no one could accuse Dr. Millspaugh of making snap judgments. On the contrary, one is inclined to be impatient with him for not arriving at more definite recommendations than he does. Doubtless, however, it is the very sweep of his survey that has made him cautious; whereas the casual reader would be under no such inhibition. One gathers in general that the author favors a considerable degree of integration and centralization of public welfare work; but as to the type of organization for any specific activity, Dr. Millspaugh in effect tells us to make our own selections from the materials which he has placed before us, always with a view to our own peculiar local problems.

J. H. LEEK

University of Oklahoma

Luce, Robert, *Legislative Problems*. (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1935, pp. vi, 726).

Representative Luce has recently published the fourth and last volume of his remarkable series on legislatures and legislative problems. In some

respects *Legislative Problems* is the best of the four, because it goes to the heart of what are, perhaps, the fundamental difficulties confronting the representative assembly and the lawmaker in the United States, Great Britain, and, to some extent, other countries in which liberal governments survive. The emphasis is upon problems in the United States, but enough comparison is made to illustrate that American legislative troubles are not altogether peculiar. Considerable attention is given in the first chapters of the book to the fusion or overlapping of the three great functions or powers of government in the American system, which exists in spite of the supposed separation of powers. "Judges as Legislators," the increasing share of the chief executive in the broader aspects of determining legislative policy, the use of the veto power, and the essentially non-legislative functions of Congress and the state legislatures are topics considered at length. The merits and defects of the cabinet system of government are explored as well as the feasibility of adopting some of its features in the United States. Legislative control of finances is the subject of four chapters. Six subsequent chapters deal with the problems of administrative legislation and "legislative administration". Here the counter-tendencies of American legislatures to make broad delegations of legislative power to administrative agencies and at the same time fritter away much of their time with detailed private, local, and special legislation are given quite adequate consideration. Finally, the concluding chapters are devoted to several general problems, such as the scope and purposes of the legislative function under present-day conditions, modern tendencies in law making, and the criticisms, so often heard in recent years, of legislatures and the legislative processes and product.

As in his previous books, the author here gives evidence of wide reading and scholarship and borrows liberally from his own experiences as a legislator both in the Massachusetts General Court and in Congress. His treatment is exhaustive; he shows his usual habit of delving into the historical background of his subject; he sometimes overemphasizes some matters and passes too lightly, perhaps, over others. While his tone is conservative, in that he continues to express faith not only in representative government but in the American form of representative government, he is nonetheless keenly aware of all the defects and maladies present in the latter government and is ready to accept many of the remedies upon which there is a considerable amount of agreement among political scientists. There is little that might be pointed out as original or startling in the lengthy volume, but there can be no doubt that the material accumulated within its pages is exceedingly valuable and indispensable to students of legislation and of American government in general.

O. DOUGLAS WEEKS

The University of Texas

Chapin, F. Stuart, *Contemporary American Institutions. A Sociological Analysis.* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1935, pp. xviii, 423).

The author of this volume has used the results of recent research findings in a sociological analysis of a selected group of contemporary institutions. "Social institutions," according to him, "are essentially psycho-

logical phenomena that consist of a configuration of segments of the behaviors of individuals." Quantitative data from a number of studies by the author and others are the basic materials used in analyzing local government, local politics, local business enterprises, the family, the school, the church, and social welfare agencies. The graphs and charts show the interrelatedness of individuals within institutions and of the different institutions in the community.

Considerable space is devoted to an analysis of the New Deal and the sociology of leadership in this crisis situation. Attention is called to the shortsightedness of the so-called leaders in their persistent refusal to accept ideas from the social scientists. The ardent reformer considers the social scientist a contemptible conservative while the reactionary looks upon him as a dangerous and subversive influence. In the end, "It is almost as if the critical sociologist had no place to go but out into the cold scientific garden to eat statistical worms." (p. 303).

After presenting the data on the different concrete institutions, Part V sets forth "A Scientific Approach to the Study of Social Institutions." Chapters are devoted to "A Theory of Social Institutions," "A Theory of Sociological Measurement," "An Attempt to Measure the Institutional Patterns of Churches," "A Measurement of Social Status," and "A Measurement of Personal Intimacy."

While the book is not propagandistic in nature and does not advocate any specific reform or particular plan of social reorganization, it has grown out of a realization that in the present troublous times there is a need for an understanding which goes beyond that of the ordinary politician. The author presents data which show the far-reaching influence of the social institutions of the local community. According to the author the stabilizing rôle of the institutions of the local community needs to be recognized more fully in any proposal for planning or reconstruction.

The statistically-minded person should find in the tables, graphs, charts, correlations, deviations, and percentages calculated to several decimal places sufficient evidence that sociology has passed beyond the stage of arm-chair philosophy.

WILLIAM C. SMITH

William Jewell College,
Liberty, Missouri

Thompson, Walter, *The Control of Liquor in Sweden*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1935, pp. xii, 244).

With the repeal of constitutional prohibition in the United States we have in the various states every variety of liquor legislation, ranging from practically complete license to what is supposed to be bone-dry prohibition. Most of these schemes were hurriedly imposed without much forethought to meet a situation created by a much more sudden repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment than most persons had expected. In the light of our present chaotic and variegated conditions there is much to be gained from a study of the very interesting system which has been developing in Sweden over a period of three-quarters of a century; for although we think of the Bratt system as being a phenomenon of the last twenty years or so, it is

actually only a new variant of an idea which goes back to the middle of the Nineteenth Century.

Like the English, the Swedes progress by evolution rather than revolution, and the present very advanced degree of public control of the liquor business has been reached by very gradual stages. Even now it is not by any means a governmental monopoly. The principle of private ownership of both the wholesale and the retail business is maintained, but the profits are rigidly limited and all above the fixed amount accrue to the state. Moreover the operations of the companies are strictly supervised, and we have the curious spectacle of a private corporation which is under the obligation of keeping the public from consuming its products beyond a certain amount. So simplified, the plan sounds fantastically utopian, and yet the curious thing about it is that it works. The status of the traffic is somewhat similar to that of a public utility in the United States, except that its obligation to conduct itself in the interest of public welfare is much greater.

Drinking on the American basis is apparently impossible in Sweden,—unless it is done illegally. The only way in which one can buy liquor by the drink is by ordering a meal. Otherwise it is sold only in stores (except for beer), and may not be consumed on the premises. Moreover everybody is rationed and may buy only a stated amount every month, the system being enforced by a passbook issued to every individual purchaser. One of the most interesting features of the plan is that the amount allotted is gauged to the individual purchaser, being graduated on the basis of his needs and his capacity to handle the commodity with discretion.

This work is primarily, of course, an administrative study, and such books are usually, however great their inherent virtue, notoriously dull reading. Professor Thompson's volume is, however, a notable exception to the rule. His style is fluent and admirably lucid and he has a sense of humor which is as rare as it is delightful in scholarly works. His attitude is detached and objective, enabling him to weigh the criticisms of the system in spite of his sympathetic exposition of it. Lastly, it should be said that the study is based upon personal observation and contact with the original sources, Professor Thompson having spent a year as an exchange professor in Sweden.

J. H. LEEK

University of Oklahoma

Reyes, Oscar Efren, *Historia de la República* (Ecuador). (Quito: Imprenta Nacional, 1931. pp. 334).

Reyes, Oscar Efren, *Brevisima Historia General del Ecuador*, (Quito: Editorial América, 1934. pp. 257).

Reyes, Oscar Efren, *Los Ultimos Siete Años*. (Quito: Talleres Gráficos Nacionales, 1933. pp. 207).

Reyes, O. E., *La Vida y la Obra de Manuel J. Calle*. (Quito: L. J. Fernández, 3d ed., 1930. pp. 45).

The larger of these histories is for the general reader and for advanced students. Three-fourths of its pages are devoted to the period of independ-

ence of Ecuador, covering about 110 years. The remainder goes mainly to the colonial period of Spanish exploitation, and there are two concluding chapters in the nature of a philosophy of the history of Ecuador, reviewing the country's political trends and economic and cultural progress. Even these last are concrete and factual, although the data are arranged in such a manner as to indicate a developmental philosophy. The main body of the work is factual and interesting, bringing out graphically the main movements and problems of the history, such as the social, economic and political exploitation of the colony, the anarchy during the Napoleonic period, the influence of the ideology of the French Revolution, the idealism of the early national period, the reaction and period of dictators (it is the same everywhere in Latin America in the middle of the nineteenth century), the rise of constitutional government and liberal parties, recent economic development, and the new economic dictatorships since 1900, resulting from a new and non-political exploitation.

The smaller history is for elementary pupils and emphasizes the more patriotic aspects of the national history, especially the winning of the independence and the growth of nationality.

The Last Seven Years is an account of the dictatorship through which Ecuador passed from about 1925 to 1932 or 1933. It is the usual sordid story of political intrigue and economic exploitation, the suppression of freedom and persecution—all of which is graphically and interestingly told. Many photographic reproductions help out the text of both this and the larger history.

The brief life of the Ecuadorian journalist, M. J. Calle, not only portrays the exploits of a leader of his craft, but gives insight into a very interesting, if somewhat neurotic, personality. Much insight into the political cross currents and the cultural backgrounds of the life of Ecuador is also to be had from this monograph, now in its third printing.

L. L. BERNARD

Washington University

Ryan, Frederick Lynn, *The Rehabilitation of Oklahoma Coal Mining Communities*. (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1935, pp. 120).

This study is the first in a series of five which the author has outlined on the rehabilitation of Oklahoma communities. It traces the development of the coal mining communities from their beginning in the 1870's through their prosperous years and their decline since 1922. The study analyzes the connection between community organization and private-enterprise exploitation of coal deposits, and comes to the conclusion that private enterprise has failed to afford an opportunity in recent years for a wholesome and adequate type of community life. These communities have had a grave economic problem placed on their door-step by private enterprise in the form of poverty and disintegration. Therefore the problem arises as to what needs to be done to rehabilitate life in the coal counties of Eastern Oklahoma, if cultural and social standards are to be restored.

The book should be of interest to all who are students of community

planning and the social and economic consequences of exploitation of natural resources by private enterprise, which is here again shown to be a haphazard and wasteful process. Mr. Ryan clearly demonstrates that the inadequacy of community life and the deterioration of towns in the coal areas are the by-products of a system that has left the miners and farmers in their present plight and without any hope of betterment unless this policy is supplanted either by the minimum requirement of a revamped capitalism or by a thorough-going system of community planning, in which both the State and Federal Government co-operate.

Mr. Ryan examines in some detail the social waste and inadequacy arising out of private capitalism, and suggests remedies to repair some of the damages community life has suffered. His far-reaching proposal would constitute an almost complete transformation of the economic life of Eastern Oklahoma, through supplanting the present chaos by social and economic planning for the general welfare.

GLEN PARKER

University of Texas

Blachly, Frederick F., and Oatman, Miriam E., *Administrative Legislation and Adjudication*. (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1934, pp. xv, 289).

Administrative Legislation and Adjudication is an important contribution to a better understanding of what might, with no great difficulty, be characterized as the most important governmental problem in the United States at the present time. The exercise of what amounts to legislative and judicial power by administrative agencies has been growing steadily during the past fifty years and more particularly during the past twenty or the past three years. Quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers have not received frank consideration at the hands of our courts nor adequate treatment by writers either in the fields of legislation or administration. It does not suffice to dismiss the powers as mere "administrative powers". Even though both may be in the hands of the same executive or administrative agency and may be so commingled and confused by those who use them that they seem indistinguishable, the fact remains that legislative and judicial powers are essentially distinct, and, wherever delegated or assigned, their use should be properly safeguarded by requiring in the case of each proper procedures and by establishing adequate checks in the hands of both the legislature and the courts. This is not to say that the increase of such powers in administrative officers or bodies should be, or can be, curtailed; it is inevitable that the legislature and the courts are becoming more and more inadequate as governmental agencies to handle a vast amount of legislative detail and judicial business. They must, however, be left with the power to say the last word if the evils of bureaucracy are to be averted. This can best be accomplished, perhaps, by permitting a wide range of administrative activity of a legislative and judicial nature but within better defined limits which would prevent meddling by the legislature and the courts, but which would leave with them the essential checks upon arbitrary administrative action. By carefully describing, analyzing, and classifying the forms which these types of governmental

action take, and the procedures followed in arriving at quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial decisions, the writers of the present volume have not only greatly helped to clarify our thinking, but they have materially assisted in preparing the way for an adequate solution to a most pressing and important governmental problem.

O. DOUGLAS WEEKS

The University of Texas

Hart, Hornell, and Hart, Ella B., *Personality and the Family*. (New York: D. C. Heath and Company, 1935, pp. xiii, 381).

The aim of this book is a practical one. According to the authors, it was written "primarily as an aid to the student in finding fulfillment of personality" in and through successful family life. Very little space is devoted to historical backgrounds or to discussions of various theories, but an attack is made upon present-day situations. Concrete problems are discussed, such as: the dynamics of family life; past and present sexual behavior; matching for successful marriage; industrial change and the family; divorce; creative relations between husband and wife; creative interaction of parents with children; family counseling; eugenics; etc.

Recent research data are used freely in these discussions, but on several problems the scientific findings are inadequate. The scientific approach then gives way to the common-sense, speculative, and hortatory methods. As a single example we may point to the discussion of the servant problem (pp. 171-73) which is based on a meager factual foundation.

While the book may be accused of being too hortatory, it does face facts squarely and calls a spade a spade. At the present time young people are asking questions and are seeking information as they face marriage and family responsibilities. Since adequate research data are not available as dependable guides for youth in this segment of life, then a wholesome common-sense discussion has its value. One of the purposes of the authors has been to stimulate honest thinking on the part of the students. It seems to the reviewer that the book should fulfill expectations in a considerable measure in this respect.

While the book makes somewhat tedious reading, we are of the opinion that undergraduates can read it—and that is more than can be said for many textbooks that purport to be written for this group. We should bear in mind that this book was written not for college professors or graduate students but primarily for *undergraduates*, and for them it should aid in making a course on the family more vital.

WILLIAM C. SMITH

William Jewell College,
Liberty, Missouri.

BOOK NOTES

Two treatises dealing with the growth of legislative power in the hands of the British Crown—John Willis' *The Parliamentary Powers of English Government Departments*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,

1933, pp. 214) and Chih-Mai Chen's *Parliamentary Opinion of Delegated Legislation* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1933, pp. 149)—may be briefly reviewed together. The first, after calling attention to the discussion precipitated by the recent rapid increase in the delegation of legislative powers by Parliament, gives a resume of the development of the tendency which accompanied the growing technical problems which came to form the subject matter of legislation in the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The Great War and its aftermath and the problems of the depression have only served to accentuate the practice until it has appeared to many that Parliament was in danger of abdicating its essential legislative supremacy. The various types of delegations are described and analyzed and the reaction of the law courts is set forth. The second work under consideration opens with an introduction reviewing the general criticisms of Parliamentary delegations as presented by prominent British writers and by the Report of the Committee on Ministers' Powers. Then follows a brief historical review of Parliamentary reactions to delegations of legislative powers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, gleaned mostly from a study of Parliamentary debates and showing surprisingly little opposition down to 1906. After that date, with marked increase in delegations, opposition develops and becomes quite vociferous after the Great War. Further chapters present the gist of recent criticisms, set forth the demands for safeguards, and show the inevitable tendency of the practice to increase because of the character of present-day legislation. Parliament and the courts, however, many maintain, are not without the power to check abuses in the use of the rule-making power.

O. D. W.

In his little volume entitled *American Neutrality, 1914-1917*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1935, pp. vii, 187) Professor Charles Seymour ably defends the general thesis that "Except for the submarine, our quarrel would have been with the Allies," (p. 170), and that "Partisanship resulted primarily from emotional and political factors, and not from financial affiliations" (p. 109). The documents in question tend to sustain his contention; yet one is constrained to ask if materially interested groups did not contribute to those "emotional and political factors" and what explanations can be offered for the opinion of many responsible people, including Wilson, that regardless of the submarine the United States would have entered the war. Furthermore, it is a bit appalling to note the rather loose use of the old phrase "national interest" in the author's explanation of why the Department of State "was compelled to alter its policy" regarding loans to belligerents. It is easier to go along with Professor Seymour when he urges that "Instead of seeking an isolation that cannot be attained, we must emphasize the community of interest that America has with the rest of the world in the maintenance of peace," and that "We ought to negotiate constantly with other States to eliminate the basic causes of war, which can be attacked especially in the economic field," while standing ready at all times to help "stamp out the immediate threat of war whenever it appears" (pp. 179-180).

C. T.

The third edition of Walter Consuelo Langsam's *The World Since 1914*, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1936, pp. xvi, 888) has recently appeared. The scope of this book is so clearly stated in its title, and its general excellence is so widely appreciated, that only the innovations in the third edition need be discussed. The original plan of organization remains virtually unchanged; but all of the chapters have been rewritten, and those dealing with contemporary movements have, in most cases, been carried well up into 1935. The silence of the first two editions respecting recent Latin American internal developments detracted somewhat from their general usefulness; but this gap has been closed in the present edition with an informative chapter contributed by Dr. Bailey W. Diffie. Persons interested in the current Italian and Japanese expansionist movements will find much information, admirably summarized, in the chapters on post-war changes in those nations; and instructors, using the book as a text, will be greatly pleased with the expanded bibliography and the improved map equipment.

R. A. J.

National Planning and Rural Life, Proceedings of the seventeenth American Country Life Conference, Washington, D. C., November 16-19, 1934, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1935, pp. 156.) is devoted to a series of questions confronting the American people at the present time. President Nat T. Frame of the conference, made the statement in his address, herein published that "We are concerned lest the farmer's furnishing the world cheap food may be at the expense of cheap people on the land". Again he said: "We are interested in life and living,—the dynamic, buoyant, spiritual life and process of rural folks." He further states that the educated farmer's scientific attitude of mind is bound to provide for the farmer of the future a social rôle which will be a noble sequel to his pioneer rôle during the first two hundred years of our history. These thoughts summarize the program of the organization, which is further elaborated in eleven addresses and papers published in this book. The purposes of the association are stated to be: (1) To promote discussion of the problems and objectives in country life and facilitate the means of their solution and attainment; (2) to further the efforts and increase the efficiency of persons and agencies engaged in this field; (3) to disseminate information calculated to promote a better understanding of country life; and (4) to aid in rural improvement.

B. C. T.

One's complacency about progress is somewhat deflated after reading Grace A. Browning's *The Development of Poor Relief in Kansas* (Social Service Monographs No. 25, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1935, pp. xviii, 157). It is discouraging to find that a western state, in which one would expect to find a progressive attitude, has done little more than borrow the legislation of the older eastern states in regard to poor relief. Moreover relatively little change has occurred on that foundation since the beginning. Some improvement has taken place with regard to specialized care for different types of the unfortunate, but the county is still the basic

unit for relief, and the shamefully inadequate poor farm is still generally retained. (Of course it should not be assumed that Kansas is the only offender in these respects). The legislative and administrative material of the text is enlivened by much actual case material, and there is added a valuable appendix of laws and judicial decisions bearing on the subject, prepared by Sophonisba P. Breckenridge.

J. H. L.

Bolsas y Mercados de Comercio, by German M. Fernández (2d ed., Talleres Gráficos Pomponio, Rosario, Argentina, 1935, pp. 215) is divided into three parts, dealing with the Argentine exchanges and markets, the commercial exchange of Rosario, and Rosario considered as a commission, transportation and exchange center. Rosario is the second city in Argentina (with nearly 200,000 population) and is the center of the grain and cattle trade. The chief emphases in this volume are naturally upon the organization of the Rosario Exchange, the laws and rules governing it and other exchanges in Argentina, and the services rendered on the commercial side. The work is fundamental and reliable. Economic and legal emphasis about balance each other. There is a brief chapter on "Social Questions" at the end, showing that the agitation about market manipulation has reached Argentina.

L. L. B.

Las Marovillosas Tierras del Acre (Talleres Tipográficos del Colegio Don Bosco, La Paz, Bolivia, 1935, pp. 747), by Ciro Torres López is a most interesting account of an airplane journey into the Amazonic forests of northeast Bolivia and western Brazil. The text describes the people, the country, the industries, transportation (many steamboats now ply the large tropical rivers), the town and forest life of the natives, and the antiquities. The book is well illustrated, often with airplane views, and there are some good outline maps. The style is interesting and the book is altogether informative and useful.

L. L. B.

Triunfalmente (José M. Serrano, Editor, Montevideo, 1933, 101 pp.) by Rómulo Nano Lottero, an outstanding literary and political personality of Uruguay, is a graphic and somewhat impressionistic account of the Battilistic and agrarian revolutions that have taken place in that country in recent years. The volume contains some articles, an interview, two manifestos, a report, three news articles, and some descriptive incidents, all together being intended to give a picture of the movement.

L. L. B.